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We set up a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms from one
country (the source country) can offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. The
most productive firms self-select into offshoring, and the impact on welfare in the source
country can be positive or negative, depending on the share of firms engaged in offshoring.
Each firm is run by an entrepreneur, and inequality between entrepreneurs and workers as
well as intra-group inequality among entrepreneurs is higher with offshoring than in autarky.
All results hold in a model extension with firm-level rent sharing, which results in aggregate
unemployment. In this extended model, offshoring furthermore has non-monotonic effects on
unemployment and intra-group inequality among workers. The paper also offers a calibration
exercise to quantify the effects of offshoring.
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Fragmentation of production processes across country borders, leading to the offshoring of tasks
that used to be performed domestically, is widely seen as a new paradigm in international trade.
Public opinion in high-income countries has been very critical of this phenomenon, and much
more so than of traditional forms of international trade, since it seems obvious that offshoring
to low-wage countries destroys domestic jobs.1 Academic research has drawn a more nuanced
picture with respect to the effects of offshoring. Two major effects of offshoring have been
identified. First, offshoring has indeed the obvious international relocation effect emphasised in
the public discussion, as tasks that were previously performed domestically are now performed
offshore. In addition, however, there is a firm-level productivity effect, as the ability to source
tasks from a low-wage location abroad lowers a firm’s marginal cost.
We show in this paper that important additional insights into the effects of offshoring can be
gained by adding firm differences to the picture, thereby acknowledging the empirical regularity
that only a rather small share of firms makes actually use of the offshoring opportunity.2 In
particular, we show that both the international relocation effect and the firm-level productivity
effect have new implications in the presence of firm heterogeneity, thereby jointly shaping wel-
fare and inequality in the source country of offshoring. To conduct our analysis, we set up a
two-country general equilibrium model that features monopolistic competition between hetero-
geneous firms, not all of which find it worthwhile to offshore in equilibrium. Firms need to be
run by an entrepreneur, and in order to introduce a stark asymmetry between the two countries
we assume that entrepreneurs exist in only one of them, making this country the source country
1As pointed out by The Economist (2009), “Americans became almost hysterical” about the job destruction
due to offshoring, when Forrester Research predicted a decade ago that 3.3 million American jobs will be offshored
until 2015.
2Based on information of the IAB Establishment Panel from the Institute for Employment Research in Nurem-
berg, Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro (2009) report that only 14.9 percent of the 8, 466 plants in this data-set
undertake some offshoring and that, on average, offshoring firms are larger, use better technology, and pay higher
wages than their non-offshoring competitors. In a survey of 150 British firms, 30 percent of the producers stated
that they conduct part of their production abroad (The Economist, 2004). By contrast, in a survey of 118,300
Japanese manufacturing firms only 3.3 percent of the producers declare to be involved in international outsourcing
and/or FDI (Tomiura, 2007).
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of offshoring in equilibrium. In the source county, agents are symmetric in their productivity
as production workers, but they differ in their entrepreneurial abilities. These abilities are in-
strumental for firm productivity and thus for the profit income the entrepreneur earns when
becoming owner-manager of a firm. Agents in the source country are free to choose between
occupations, and individual ability determines who becomes entrepreneur or production worker
(see Lucas, 1978).
Similar to Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011) we model
output of a firm as a composite of different tasks, and furthermore assume that only part of
the tasks performed by a firm are offshorable. According to the taxonomy in Becker, Ekholm,
and Muendler (2012), these are tasks that are routine (Levy and Murnane, 2004) and do not
require face-to-face contact (Blinder, 2006). Since offshoring from the source country is the only
employment opportunity for workers in the host country, wages there are generally lower than
in the source country, which provides an incentive for offshoring from the perspective of firms
in the source country. This incentive is not unmitigated, since firms relocating their routine
tasks abroad need to hire a freelance offshoring agent, resulting in a fixed offshoring cost, and
in addition shipping back to the source country the intermediate inputs produced in the host
country is subject to iceberg trade costs. If these variable offshoring costs are sufficiently high,
our model produces the well established result that only the most productive firms are active in
international markets. In line with empirical evidence, this is the case we are focusing on in our
analysis.
We show that offshoring reduces welfare in the source country if variable offshoring costs are
so high that only a small share of firms choose to move their routine tasks abroad. Instrumental
for the welfare loss is the well-known international relocation effect, which now interacts with
firm-heterogeneity: The first firms to offshore are those with the highest productivity, and hence
the highest employment. The absolute number of production jobs relocated abroad among the
“early offshorers” is therefore large, not all workers losing their jobs as production workers can
find employment as offshoring agents, and as a consequence some of the workers in the source
country will necessarily turn to entrepreneurship themselves. The mass of firms in the source
country therefore rises, which exacerbates the distortion of excessive firm entry already present
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in the autarky equilibrium of our model. This domestic reallocation effect, moving workers into
occupations that are less desirable from an economy-wide perspective, leads to a decrease in
source-country welfare. By contrast, offshoring increases welfare of the source country relative
to autarky if the variable offshoring costs are low. Two effects are responsible for the change
in the sign of the welfare effect: On the one hand, the firm-level productivity effect (which is
negligible at very high offshoring costs) now has a significant (positive) influence on aggregate
welfare. On the other hand, the domestic reallocation effect becomes less unfavourable, and may
even become welfare increasing by itself, with the least efficient firms leaving the market as in
Melitz (2003), thereby reducing the distortion of excessive firm entry in our model.
Offshoring has a non-monotonic effect on inequality of entrepreneurial incomes according to
the Gini criterion, with the reduction in variable offshoring costs leading to larger inequality of
entrepreneurial incomes when the share of offshoring firms is low, and the reverse effect when
the share of offshoring firms is high. The reasoning is straightforward: offshoring always boosts
the profits of the newly offshoring firms, and these firms are those at the top of the productiv-
ity distribution in the early stages of offshoring, and those at the bottom of the productivity
distribution later on. By contrast, the effect of offshoring on intergroup inequality between en-
trepreneurs and workers is monotonically increasing in the share of offshoring firms. Both types
of inequality are higher in any offshoring equilibrium than in autarky, and hence offshoring gen-
erates a superstar effect favouring the incomes of the best entrepreneurs, similar to Gersbach
and Schmutzler (2007).
In the main part of our paper, we assume that the market for production labour is perfectly
competitive, in line with the key contributions to the offshoring literature, such as Jones and
Kierzkowski (1990), Feenstra and Hanson (1996), Kohler (2004), Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008), and Rodriguez-Clare (2010). While this version of our model serves the purpose well to
isolate the role of firm heterogeneity in the offshoring process, we show that it is straightforward
to extend the framework by using a more sophisticated model of the labour market. In this
extended version of the model, there is rent-sharing at the firm level, leading to wage differenti-
ation among production workers and to involuntary unemployment. Interestingly, all our results
from the full-employment version of the model remain qualitatively unchanged. In addition, the
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version with firm-level rent sharing generates new results regarding the effect of offshoring on
aggregate unemployment, and on inequality within the group of production workers. In partic-
ular, we show that both the effect of offshoring on unemployment and the effect on intra-group
inequality among production workers are non-monotonic in the share of offshoring firms, with
unemployment and inequality being lower than in autarky when only few firms offshore, while
the reverse is true when a large share of them does so. By considering homogeneous workers,
our theory thereby offers an explanation for the large variation in wage effects that offshoring
has on workers within the same skill group (cf. Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang, 2011).
Only few papers in the literature on offshoring consider firm heterogeneity. Antras, Gari-
cano, and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) develop a model with team production, in which offshoring is
synonymous to the formation of international teams. Individuals are heterogeneous in their skill
level, and the highest-skill individuals self-select into becoming team managers. Since individu-
als with higher skills are more productive in the role of a production worker as well as in the role
of a manager, offshoring – by providing access to a large, relatively low-skilled foreign labour
force – not only increases the incentives of workers to become managers in the source country,
but also reduces the average skill level of the domestic workforce. Due to positive assortative
matching between managers and workers, the top managers therefore end up being matched
with workers of a lower skill level in the open economy, and hence they lose relative to less
able managers. This is a key difference to the superstar effect present in our model. Davidson,
Matusz, and Shevchenko (2008) consider high-skill offshoring in a model with search frictions,
in which firms can choose whether to produce with an advanced technology or a traditional
technology, and workers are either high-skill or low-skill. Their framework is very different from
ours, in that all firms hire only a single worker, and in an offshoring equilibrium they have to
decide whether to do so domestically or abroad. This rules out adjustments in firm size and
thus closes one important channel through which offshoring affects domestic employment in our
model.
At a more general level, the model developed in this paper builds on the large literature
that studies offshoring to low-wage countries in frameworks with either identical or atomistic
firms. The literature distinguishes two possible forms of offshoring: The first one is vertical
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multinational activity which associates offshoring with setting up a foreign affiliate and relocating
production within the boundaries of a firm (see Helpman, 1984; Markusen, 2002). The second one
is international outsourcing, which associates offshoring with imports of intermediates that are
purchased from an external supplier at arm’s length (see Jones and Kierzkowski, 1990; Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996; Kohler, 2004; Rodriguez-Clare, 2010).3 Our paper is related in particular to
Rodriguez-Clare (2010), whose Ricardian general equilibrium model shows a mechanism different
from ours that leads to potential welfare losses for the source country of offshoring. In the paper
by Rodriguez-Clare (2010), welfare losses for the source country can arise due to negative terms
of trade effects at the final goods level, a channel that is not active in our model, which features
only a single final good.4,5
Since we also consider an extension to our basic framework, in which we model involuntary
unemployment resulting from firm-level rent sharing, our paper is also related to contributions
that consider offshoring in the presence of labour market imperfections. One of them is Egger
and Kreickemeier (2008), who introduce a fair-wage effort mechanism into a multi-sector tra-
ditional trade model with high-skilled and low-skilled workers to investigate the consequences
of offshoring on relative wages and unemployment. Grossman and Helpman (2008) explore in
a model with fair wage preferences how offshoring alters workers’ fairness considerations and
analyse to what extent this provides so far unexplored incentives for firms to shift production
abroad. Keuschnigg and Ribi (2009) study the labour market implications of offshoring in a
setting with search frictions and investigate the scope for government interventions to make
3The literature has also shed light on those factors that govern the decision to offshore as a vertical multinational
or in the form of outsourcing. Thereby, contractual imperfections as well as the costs of searching a suitable input
supplier are highlighted as important obstacles to a market solution (see McLaren, 2000; Grossman and Helpman,
2003; Antràs and Helpman, 2004).
4In a broader interpretation, a country’s terms of trade also capture the price of intermediate goods. While
the price of imported intermediates may indeed increase, thereby worsening the terms of trade for the source
country, this is not instrumental for the potentially negative welfare effects of offshoring in our setting.
5Acemoglu, Gancia, and Zilibotti (2012) consider a Ricardian model in which offshoring induces directed
technical change. With technical change favoring high-skilled workers at low levels of offshoring, this model
provides a rationale for the empirical observation of rising skill premia in developed as well as developing countries.
Costinot, Vogel, and Wang (2012) use a Ricardian framework with many goods and countries to study vertical
specialisation of countries along the international supply chain.
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offshoring Pareto improving by introducing suitable instruments of redistribution. Mitra and
Ranjan (2010) consider a two-sector traditional trade model with labour market imperfection due
to search frictions and shed light on how the degree of inter-sectoral labour mobility influences
the consequences of offshoring for employment and wages. While all of these studies highlight
important channels through which offshoring can impact domestic labour markets, they do not
shed light on the specific role of firm heterogeneity or the consequences of occupational choice.6
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model and
derive some preliminary results regarding the decision of firms to offshore and its implications
for firm-level profits. We also characterize the factor allocation in the open economy equilibrium
and show how the share of offshoring firms is linked to the variable cost of offshoring. In Section
3, we analyse how changes in the offshoring costs affect factor allocation, welfare and income
distribution in our model. In Section 4 we present the extended version of our model that
features firm-level rent sharing and involuntary unemployment. In Section 5, we use parameter
estimates from existing empirical research to calibrate the extended version of our model, thereby
quantifying the implications of offshoring on welfare, unemployment and income inequality in
a model-consistent way. In Section 6 we analyse to what extent the link between offshoring
and inequality in our setting depends on the specific measures of inequality considered in this
paper. In addition, we introduce a comprehensive measure of inequality that allows us to rank
the economy-wide distributions of income under offshoring and in autarky. Section 7 concludes
our analysis with a brief summary of the most important results.
2 A model of offshoring and firm heterogeneity
We consider an economy with two sectors: a final goods industry that uses differentiated in-
termediates as the only inputs, and an intermediate goods industry that employs labour for
6There is also a sizable literature that studies vertical multinational activity in models of union wage setting
and product market imperfection. Existing contributions usually consider a partial equilibrium environment, and
hence they are not equipped to identify economy-wide employment effects. Prominent examples include Mezzetti
and Dinopoulos (1991), Skaksen and Sørensen (2001), Skaksen (2004), and Lommerud, Meland, and Straume
(2009).
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performing two tasks, which differ in their offshorability. One task is non-routine and requires
face-to-face communication, and it must therefore be produced at the firm’s headquarters loca-
tion. The other task is routine and can be either produced at home or abroad. Each firm in the
intermediates goods industry is run by an entrepreneur, who decides on hiring workers for both
tasks. We embed the economy just described in a world economy with two countries, where
the second country differs from the first in only one respect: the second country does not have
any entrepreneurs. Given our production technology, the country without entrepreneurs cannot
headquarter any firms, and therefore ends up being the host country of offshoring. The other
country is the source country of offshoring. Trade is balanced in equilibrium, with the source
country exporting the final good in exchange for the tasks offshored to the host country. In the
remainder of this section, we discuss in detail the main building blocks of the model and derive
some preliminary results.
2.1 The final goods industry









where V is the set of available intermediate goods with Lebesgue measure M , and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a
preference parameter that is directly linked to the elasticity of substitution between the different
varieties in the production of Y : σ ≡ (1 − ρ)−1 > 1. The production technology in Eq. (1) is a
limiting case of the technology considered by Ethier (1982), featuring constant returns to scale
in the economy-wide production of final output. Final output is sold under perfect competition.
We choose Y as the numéraire and set its price equal to one. Profit maximization in the final





2.2 The intermediates goods industry
In the intermediate goods sector, there is a mass M of firms that sell differentiated products q(v)
under monopolistic competition. Each firm is run by a single entrepreneur who acts as owner-
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manager and combines a non-routine task, which must be performed at the firm’s headquarters
location in the source country, and a routine task, which can either be produced at home or
abroad. We denote the non-routine task by superscript n and the routine task by superscript
r. In analogy to Antràs and Helpman (2004) and Acemoglu and Autor (2011), we assume
that the two tasks are inputs in a Cobb-Douglas production function for intermediate goods.
Assuming that one unit of labour is needed for one unit of each task, the production function









where ϕ(v) denotes firm-specific productivity, ln(v) and lr(v) are the labour inputs in firm v
for the production of the respective tasks, and η ∈ (0, 1) measures the relative weight (cost
share) of the non-routine task in the production of the intermediate good.7 With a labour input
coefficient of one, the unit production cost for the non-routine task is equal to the domestic wage
rate w for all firms. The unit production cost for the routine task ωr(v) differs between firms,
since it depends on whether a firm decides to perform the task domestically or abroad. We can










For purely domestic producers, which we denote by superscript d, the unit production cost for
the routine task is given by w, which implies z(v) = 1 and cd(v) = w/ϕ(v). If a firm produces
purely domestically, there is hence no difference between the two-task technology in (3) and the
single-task technology usually considered in trade models with heterogeneous producers. By
7Our production function can easily be extended to account for a continuum of tasks that differ in their
offshorability as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008). Firms would then not only choose their offshoring
status, but also decide on the range of tasks they relocate abroad. In a supplement, available from the authors
upon request, we show that all offshoring firms would choose to offshore the same range of tasks, irrespective of
their own productivity ϕ(v). As the only additional effect in this more sophisticated model variant, a decline in
the cost of offshoring would not only be associated with more firms entering offshoring, but also with an increase
in the range of tasks offshored by infra-marginal firms. Since the general equilibrium implications of the latter
effect are well understood from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we focus here on the extensive margin of
offshoring between rather than the intensive margin within firms.
9
contrast, the distinction between routine and non-routine tasks matters if we look at offshoring
firms. An offshoring firm, denoted by superscript o, fragments the production process and hires
workers in the host country to perform the routine task. The unit production cost for the routine
task is therefore given by the effective foreign wage rate τw∗, where τ > 1 represents the iceberg
transport costs an offshoring firm has to incur when importing the output of the routine task













measures the relative change in overall marginal cost that a firm achieves by moving its routine
tasks abroad. Contrasting (4) and (5), it follows that z(v) = κ must hold in the case of offshoring
firms. Assuming that offshoring also requires the fixed input of one freelance offshoring agent,
it is only attractive for source country producers to move routine tasks abroad if κ > 1, making
κ the marginal cost savings factor that a firm can achieve by offshoring.9
Firms in the intermediates sector set prices as a constant markup 1/ρ over marginal cost,
















respectively. Using Eqs. (5) and (6), we can compute relative operating profits of two firms with




With κ > 1, an offshoring firm makes higher operating profits than a purely domestic firm with
identical productivity. Analogously, the relative operating profits by two firms with the same








, i ∈ {d, o}, (8)
8We use an asterisk to denote variables pertaining to the host country of offshoring.
9While κ is endogenous, it is easy to see that at least some firms will offshore in equilibrium, provided that
variable offshoring costs τ are finite. If no firm were to shift production of routine tasks abroad, w∗ would fall to
zero and κ would go to to infinity, rendering offshoring an attractive choice for source country firms.
10We suppress firm index v from now on, because a firm’s performance is fully characterised by its position in
the productivity distribution and its offshoring status.
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where ξ ≡ σ − 1. Therefore, given their offshoring status, more productive firms make higher
operating profits.
2.3 Equilibrium factor allocation
We assume that the source and the host country of offshoring are populated by N and N∗ agents,
respectively. While the population in the host country has only access to a single activity, namely
the performance of routine tasks in the foreign affiliates of offshoring firms, agents in the source
country can choose from a set of three possible occupations: entrepreneurship, employment as
a production worker, and self-employment as an offshoring agent. An entrepreneur is owner-
manager of the firm, and her ability determines firm productivity. To keep things simple, we
assume that entrepreneurial ability maps one-to-one into firm productivity, and we can therefore
use a single variable, ϕ, to refer to ability as well as productivity. Being the residual claimant, the
entrepreneur receives firm profits as individual income. Agents differ in their entrepreneurial
abilities, and hence in the profits they can realize when running a firm. Following standard
practice, we assume that abilities (and thus productivities) follow a Pareto distribution, for
which the lower bound is normalised to 1: G(ϕ) = 1 − ϕ−k, where both k > 1 and k > ξ
are assumed in order to guarantee that the mean of firm-level producitivities and the mean of
firm-level revenues, respectively, are positive and finite.
Entrepreneurial ability is irrelevant for the two alternative activities that can be performed
in the source country of offshoring, so that agents are symmetric in this respect. If an individual
becomes a freelance offshoring agent who provides the services required for setting up a foreign
plant as a fixed input in the production process, she receives a fee s, which is determined in a
perfectly competitive market in general equilibrium. Finally, agents in the source country can
also apply for a job as production worker and perform the routine or non-routine task, receiving
wage rate w. As shown below, our equilibrium features self-selection of the most productive firms
into offshoring. This implies that the lowest-productivity firm is purely domestic. Denoting this
firm’s productivity by ϕc, we therefore arrive at indifference condition
πd(ϕc) = w = s. (9)
Eq. (9) gives the condition for indifference of the marginal entrepreneur between the three pos-
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sible occupations in terms of variables that are all endogenous. A second indifference condition
holds for the marginal offshoring firm with productivity ϕo. Since offshoring requires the fixed
input of one freelance offshoring agent, we can characterize the entrepreneur of the marginal
offshoring firm by
πo(ϕo) − πd(ϕo) = s, (10)
i.e. for the indifferent entrepreneur the gain in operating profits achieved by offshoring equals
the fixed offshoring cost. All variables in Eqs. (9) and (10) are endogenous, and both indifference
conditions are linked via their dependence on s. Using Eqs. (7) to (10), it is straightforward
to derive κρσ − 1 = (ϕc/ϕo)ξ, and with Pareto distributed productivities, the fraction χ of









= (κρσ − 1)
k
ξ , (11)
where we need to assume κ < 21/(ρσ) in order to ensure that χ < 1. A value of κ satisfying
this inequality is the case we focus on in the following, and in Section 2.4 below we derive the
condition on model parameters required for this outcome. In order to determine factor allocation
in the source country, we now substitute for the endogenous variables in Eq. (9).
Due to constant markup pricing, the income of production workers is a constant fraction ρ
of aggregate income Y . In an equilibrium with offshoring, part of the labour income accrues to
workers in the host country. Labour income per production worker in the source country, which





where L is the (endogenous) supply of production workers in the source country, and γ(χ; η) ≡
α(χ; η)/(1 + χ), with
α(χ; η) ≡ 1 + ηχ− (1 − η)χ
k−ξ
k , (13)
is the share of the total wage bill that accrues to workers in the source country. It is easily
confirmed that γ(χ; η) decreases monotonically in χ, falling from the maximum value of 1 at
χ = 0 to the minimum value of η at χ = 1.










With Pareto distributed productivities, average plant-level revenues r̄ = Y/[M(1 + χ)] are
a constant multiple k/(k − ξ) of revenues by the marginal firm, σπd(ϕc).12 Rearranging terms,









According to Eqs. (12) and (14), both the wage rate of production workers and the profit income
of the marginal entrepreneur are proportional to aggregate income Y . Using these equations to
substitute for w and πd(ϕc) in Eq. (9), we therefore get an indifference locus linking the mass
of production workers L and the mass of firms M that is independent of aggregate income:




It is immediate that L and M are positively linked via the indifference locus. The intuition is as
follows: An increase in L decreases labour income per worker, ceteris paribus, and therefore it
needs to be accompanied by an increase in M (thereby reducing average profits and also profit
income of the marginal entrepreneur) to restore indifference. A second condition linking L and
M is established by the resource constraint
L = N − (1 + χ)M, (16)
which illustrates that individuals can work as either entrepreneurs (M), offshoring agents (χM),
or production workers (L). Together, Eqs. (15) and (16) pin down the equilibrium mass of
intermediate goods producersM and the equilibrium mass of production workers L as a function










γ(χ; η)kρσ + k − ξ
]
N. (18)
The mass of firms is linked to the ability of the marginal entrepreneur by the condition M =
[1 −G(ϕc)]N , and solving for ϕc gives
ϕc =
{





In the next subsection we show how χ is determined as a function of the cost of offshoring τ .










2.4 Determining the share of offshoring firms
In this subsection, we derive the formal condition in terms of model parameters for an interior
offshoring equilibrium, i.e. a situation in which some but not all firms offshore, and we also show
how the share of offshoring firms χ varies with the cost of offshoring τ in an interior equilibrium.
For this purpose, we first look at Eq. (11), which combines all possible combinations of χ and κ
that are consistent with indifference of the marginal offshoring firm between domestic and foreign
production of routine tasks. Accordingly, we use the term offshoring indifference condition (OC)
to refer to the χ-κ relationship established by Eq. (11). A larger marginal cost savings factor
κ makes offshoring more attractive, and a larger share of firms chooses to move production of
their routine tasks abroad. Hence, the offshoring indifference condition is represented by an
upward sloping locus in Figure 1, and from our analysis above we know that χ ∈ (0, 1) requires
κ ∈ (1, 21/(ρσ)).
A second link between χ and κ can be derived from Eq. (5). Using wL = γ (χ; η) ρY from
Eq. (12), the equivalent condition for the host country given by w∗N∗ = [1 − γ (χ; η)] ρY , and
replacing L by Eq. (18) we obtain the labour market constraint (LC):
κ =
{
γ (χ; η) kρσ + k − ξ






Since γ(χ, η) decreases monotonically from 1 to η as χ increases from 0 to 1, we know that
the labour market constraint is monotonically decreasing in χ, starting from infinity. This is
intuitively plausible: At χ = 0, there is no production in the host country, and wage rates there
fall to zero, making the marginal cost savings factor κ infinitely large. With more firms starting
to offshore production, wages in the host country are bid up, thereby reducing κ. Combining
Eqs. (11) and (20), we can conclude that an interior equilibrium with χ < 1 is reached if the
right-hand side of Eq. (20), evaluated at γ(1, η) = η, is smaller than 21/(ρσ). This can obviously
be achieved for sufficiently high values of τ , and it is this parameter domain we consider in our
analysis. The result is illustrated in Figure 1. Given our parameter constraints, the LC and OC
loci intersect at some χ ∈ (0, 1).13
13Eq. (20) also illustrates that the marginal cost savings factor κ is increasing in the relative population size
N∗/N . This is quite intuitive: the larger the relative size of the host country population, ceteris paribus, the













Figure 1: Partitioning of firms by their offshoring status
While it is not possible to derive an explicit solution for χ in terms of τ , we can determine
the sign of partial derivative ∂χ/∂τ by combining Eqs. (11) and (20) to the implicit function
F (χ, τ) ≡
{
γ (χ; η) kρσ + k − ξ













Implicit differentiation yields dχ/dτ < 0 for any interior equilibrium with 0 < χ < 1. In Figure
1, higher direct costs of shipping intermediate goods, i.e. a higher parameter τ , shifts the LC
locus downwards, but does not affect the OC locus. We therefore have the intuitive result that
a higher τ reduces the marginal cost savings factor κ, and thus reduces χ, the equilibrium share
of firms that shift production of their routine task abroad. Due to the monotonic relationship
between (endogenous) χ and (exogenous) τ we can equivalently derive comparative static results
below in terms of either variable.14
14One can see in Eq. (20) that the limiting case χ → 0 is induced by τ → ∞.
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3 The effects of offshoring
The purpose of this section is to look at the effects of offshoring on key macroeconomic variables,
namely aggregate welfare and income inequality within the group of entrepreneurs as well as
between entrepreneurs and production workers. All effects are driven by the underlying reallo-
cation of domestic factors between firms and occupations, and it is therefore the link between
the level of offshoring and domestic factor allocation that we look at first. Throughout this
section, we will derive comparative static results in terms of changes in χ. As shown above,
this is equivalent to considering exogenous changes in offshoring cost τ , noting that dχ/dτ < 0.
Also, we focus on the source country, since most effects for the host country are trivial due to
our simplifying assumption that no firms are headquartered there.
3.1 Factor allocation
Changes in the extent of offshoring affect factor allocation in the source country via its effects
on the labour indifference condition (15) and on the resource constraint (16). The curves LIa
and RCa in the right quadrant of Figure 2 represent the labour indifference condition and the
resource constraint in autarky (superscript a is also used in the following to denote autarky
values), while the CA curve in the left quadrant shows how a given mass of firms translates into
a value for the cutoff ability ϕc.
From Eq. (16), an increase in χ, starting from χ = 0, rotates the RC locus counter-clockwise:
for a given mass of production workers, the viable mass of firms is reduced, simply because
offshoring firms now need to hire freelance offshoring agents. The effect on labour indifference
locus LI is less straightforward. Since the attractiveness of becoming a production worker
depends on the mass of available jobs, it is useful to consider first what offshoring does to























which can be greater or smaller than one. Eq. (21) shows how to split the effect of offshoring
on firm-level employment into the two partial effects well-known from the literature: The in-
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ternational relocation effect, showing that domestic employment per unit of output is affected
negatively by offshoring, since on the one hand the routine task is now produced by foreign
labour and on the other hand the input ratio changes in favour of the – now relatively cheaper
– routine task, is equal to η/κ < 1. The firm-level productivity effect, showing the positive em-
ployment effect due to the increase in output that the offshoring firm achieves as a consequence










Figure 2: The effect of offshoring on factor allocation
It is immediate that the effect of offshoring on firm-level employment is negative for small
values χ, since κ is close to 1, and hence the firm-level productivity effect is small. What happens
to the LI locus in this case can be seen by looking at Eq. (15): For a given mass of firms M , the
15Empirical evidence for the effect of offshoring on firm-level employment comes from Moser, Urban, and
Weder di Mauro (2009) and Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2011), who sort out the firm-level pro-
ductivity effect and the international relocation effect using matched employer-employee-data. While the former
study finds that the firm-level productivity effect dominates for the case of Germany, the opposite seems to occur
in Denmark as noted by Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch, and Xiang (2011).
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mass of production workers L decreases as a consequence of the reduced labour demand from
offshoring firms, and the LI locus rotates counter-clockwise. Formally, this result follows from
limχ→0(∂γ/∂χ) = −∞. Due to the strong reduction in the mass of production workers, not all
of them can find employment in the offshoring service sector, and, as shown by Eq. (17), the
mass of firms increases unambiguously. Graphically, the low-χ scenario is captured by locus LIo
in Figure 2, and the offshoring equilibrium is determined by the intersection of LIo with the
new resource constraint RCo. At higher levels of χ, the firm-level productivity effect becomes
more pronounced and it may eventually dominate if η is sufficiently high, i.e. if the international
relocation effect is not too strong. As a consequence, the counter-clockwise rotation of the LIo
locus is less pronounced (or even reversed) at high levels of χ, and hence the mass of firms may
fall eventually below the autarky level. The mass of production workers on the other hand never
returns to its autarky level, as can be verified by looking at Eq. (18).
3.2 Welfare
With just a single global consumption good, welfare for the source country is simply given
by source country income per capita. Aggregate income I in the source country is the sum
of profit income and offshoring service income, totalling (1 − ρ)Y due to markup-pricing, and
domestic labour income, which is equal to γ(χ, η)ρY . Using Eq. (6) for the marginal firm with









(1 + χ)[γ(χ; η)kρσ + k − ξ]




By construction, Φ(0) = 1. Income in the source country is therefore higher in an offshoring
equilibrium than in autarky if for the specific share χ of offshoring firms in this equilibrium
we have Φ(χ) > 1. In our model, an increase in the share of offshoring firms has two effects
on Φ(χ). First, there is the firm-level productivity effect, outlined in the previous subsection,
which increases welfare in the source country, ceteris paribus. Second, the changes in firm-level
domestic employment in newly offshoring firms induce a domestic reallocation of labour, either
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towards the newly offshoring firms (if the firm-level employment effect derived in Eq. (21) is
positive) or away from them (otherwise). In the process the wage rate changes, and since the
pools of production workers and entrepreneurs are linked via indifference condition (9), the
mass of entrepreneurs changes as well. It is this facet of the domestic reallocation effect that
is directly welfare relevant, since the autarky equilibrium of our model features excessive firm
entry relative to the social planner solution. Any offshoring-induced increase in the mass of firms
reinforces this distortion and therefore has a negative effect on welfare in the source country,
ceteris paribus, and vice versa.16
At low levels χ, the firm-level productivity effect is negligible (this is why only the most pro-
ductive firms choose to offshore), while the domestic reallocation effect leads to an unambiguous
increase in the mass of firms as offshoring firms are large and therefore dismiss a relatively large
number of workers when shifting their production of routine tasks abroad. As a consequence,
at low levels of χ, welfare in the source country falls relative to autarky. Things are different if
a large share of firms is engaged in offshoring. In this case, two effects work in favour of higher
welfare: First, the positive firm-level productivity effect is now sizable, and it affects a larger
share of firms. Second, the domestic reallocation effect is now more favourable since the newly
offshoring firms are relatively small, so that a marginal increase in χ shifts fewer – if any –
workers towards entrepreneurship. Under the empirically plausible sufficient condition η ≥ 1/2
we can show that Φ′(1) > 0 and Φ(1) > 1, and hence that welfare increases at high levels of χ,
and that it is higher at high levels of offshoring than in autarky.17 The reason is that if χ is close
to one and η ≥ 1/2, fewer firms are active in the offshoring equilibrium than under autarky, so
that offshoring provides a (partial) remedy for the distortion of firm entry in our model, and
this is sufficient for a welfare stimulus in the source country.
16Our production technology in Eq. (1) neutralises an externality that is present in the general CES production
function used by Ethier (1982): increasing returns to scale in the economy-wide production of final goods. With
increasing returns to scale, additional firm entry in the intermediates sector generates a positive externality, which
we exclude here. In the more general Ethier case, the distortion resulting from excessive entry is therefore reduced
relative to our case, and it disappears for the special case of the CES production function used, e.g., by Matusz
(1996).
17Blinder (2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2012) report that one quarter of all tasks in US production are
offshorable, which suggests that η is close to 0.75.
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As outlined above, offshoring of just a few firms exerts negative welfare effects in the source
country, because the domestic reallocation effect is relatively strong, while the firm-level produc-
tivity effect is relatively weak in this case. We now show that this result is a direct consequence
of firm heterogeneity by comparing it to the outcome in a model where all firms have the same
productivity, which is the special case of our framework with k → ∞. In the case of homogeneous
producers, all firms have a finite productivity (equal to 1, the lower bound of the Pareto distri-
bution). Consequently, the firm-level productivity effect of offshoring is of first order already at
χ = 0, since the marginal cost savings factor κ making firms indifferent between offshoring and
not offshoring is now equal to 21/(ρσ) independent of the level of χ. At the same time, for low
levels of χ the domestic reallocation effect is mitigated relative to the benchmark of heteroge-
neous firms because the first offshoring firms are now smaller, and hence the mass of workers
losing their job in newly offshoring firms is reduced. One can show that as a result welfare is
increasing monotonically in χ.
While the main focus of this paper is on the consequences of offshoring in the source country,
it is also worth taking a closer look at its implications for global welfare. Noting that world-wide
per-capita income is proportional to output Y and accounting for Y/Y a = Φ(χ)/[1−ρ+γ(χ; η)ρ],
it follows from Eq. (23) that offshoring unambiguously stimulates global welfare. This is intuitive,
because in our model the only motive for offshoring is cost saving, and cheaper production
provides a source of welfare gain, despite a negative impact of excessive firm entry at low levels
of χ. We summarize our insights regarding the welfare implications of offshoring in the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 Welfare in the source country decreases with the share of offshoring firms at low
levels of χ. Under the sufficient condition η ≥ 1/2, the effect is reversed as more firms offshore,
and welfare surpasses its autarky level if χ is sufficiently large. Global welfare is higher in any
offshoring equilibrium than in autarky.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in the Appendix.
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3.3 Inequality among entrepreneurs and between groups
Intra-group inequality of entrepreneurial income is measured by the Gini coefficient for profit










The relationship between Gini coefficient AM (χ) and the share of offshoring firms χ is non-
monotonic. An increase in χ generates a profit gain for newly offshoring firms. If the share
of offshoring firms is small, an increase in χ implies that newly offshoring firms are run by
entrepreneurs with high ability, and these are firms that already ranked high in the profit
distribution prior to offshoring. Hence, an increase in χ raises the dispersion of profit income in
this case. Things are different at high levels of χ, because newly offshoring firms are now firms
with a low rank in the distribution of profit income and an increase in χ therefore lowers the
dispersion of profit income. Furthermore, comparing AM (χ) for χ > 0 with AM (0), we find that
offshoring increases the dispersion of profit income relative to the benchmark of no offshoring,
irrespective of the prevailing level of χ. This result is due to the fact that the common fixed cost
of offshoring disproportionately affects the profits of less productive firms, thereby contributing
to an increase in the dispersion of profit incomes.
Inter-group inequality is measured by the ratio of average entrepreneurial income and average
labour income, where the latter is simply given by wage rate w. According to (14), average
entrepreneurial income, ψ̄, is equal to πd(ϕc)(1 + χ)k/(k − ξ) − χs. Applying indifference
condition (9), the ratio of average entrepreneurial income and average income of production







It follows immediately that inter-group inequality rises monotonically in the share of offshoring
firms χ. The intuition is as follows. A higher value of χ indicates that the marginal cost saving
factor κ must be higher, which in turn implies that profits of all offshoring firms increase, both in
absolute terms and relative to the profits of the marginal firm in the market. Since the marginal
firm’s profits are equal to w, it is clear that inter-group inequality has to go up in response to
an increase in χ.
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The following proposition summarizes the results.
Proposition 2 The inequality of entrepreneurial income, measured by the Gini coefficient, rises
with the share of offshoring firms at low levels of χ, and decreases at high levels of χ, while
always staying higher than in the benchmark situation without offshoring. Increasing the share of
offshoring firms χ leads to a monotonic increase in inter-group inequality between entrepreneurs
and workers.
4 Offshoring in the presence of firm-level rent-sharing
In this section, we extend our framework by a more sophisticated model of the labour market
in order to address the widespread concern that offshoring has a negative effect on aggregate
employment in a country that shifts production of routine tasks to a low-wage location. More
specifically, we develop a model of firm-level rent sharing in an imperfectly competitive labour
market to get a framework that features involuntary unemployment and at the same time cap-
tures the stylised fact that more profitable firms pay higher wages (cf. Blanchflower, Oswald,
and Sanfey, 1996). As we show in the following, all the results derived so far are robust with
respect to this extension.
The labour market model proposed in this section is a fair-wage effort model which builds
upon the idea of gift exchange, and whose main assumptions are rooted in insights from psycho-
logical research (see Akerlof, 1982; Akerlof and Yellen, 1990). The model postulates a positive
link between a firm’s wage payment and a worker’s effort provision, and workers exert full effort,
normalised to equal 1, if and only if they are paid at least the wage they consider fair. As in
Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) we assume that the fair wage ŵ is a weighted average of firm-
level operating profits π(ϕ) and the average wage of production workers (1 − U)w̄, where U is
the unemployment rate of production workers and w̄ is the average wage of those production
workers who are employed:
ŵ(ϕ) = [π(ϕ)]θ [(1 − U)w̄]1−θ (26)
An analogous condition holds in the host country of offshoring. Following Akerlof and Yellen
(1990), we assume that effort decreases proportionally with the wage, and hence firms have
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no incentive to pay less than ŵ. On the other hand, one can show that the model features
involuntary unemployment in equilibrium, and therefore even low-productivity firms do not
need to pay more than ŵ to attract workers. Hence, w(ϕ) = ŵ(ϕ), and Eq. (26) describes the
distribution of wages across firms as a function of firm-level operating profits.18 In contrast to
the full employment version of our model the decision to become a production worker now carries
an income risk, since wages are firm-specific. We make the standard assumption that workers
have to make their career choice before they know the outcome of the job allocation process
among applicants (cf. Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010).19 With risk neutrality of individuals, the
indifference condition for the marginal entrepreneur now becomes
πd(ϕc) = (1 − U)w̄ = s. (9′)
In comparison to the full employment version of our model, the relative operating profits of
more productive firms are lower with rent-sharing, since part of the advantage stemming from
higher productivity is compensated by having to pay a higher wage rate. Formally, the elasticity
of firm-level relative operating profits with respect to relative firm productivity (cf. Eq. (8)) is
no longer given by ξ ≡ σ − 1, but by ξ̄ ≡ (σ − 1)/[1 + θ(σ − 1)], which is smaller than ξ if θ is
strictly positive.20 It then follows from Eq. (26) that the elasticity of firm-level relative wages
with respect to relative productivities is given by θξ̄. Notably, this holds true not only in the
source country, but also in the host country: highly productive firms pay higher wages in the
host country than their less productive competitors.21
18Even though firms set wages unilaterally, their profit maximization problem does not differ from the one in
Section 2.2. As pointed out by Amiti and Davis (2012), wages depend positively on profits due to fair wage
constraint (26), and hence the firm has no incentive to manipulate the wage, but instead treats it parametrically
at the equilibrium level w(ϕ) = ŵ(ϕ).
19Production workers would of course prefer to work for a firm that offers higher wages and, in the absence of
unemployment compensation, those who do not have a job would clearly benefit from working for any positive
wage rate. However, since due to contractual imperfections it is impossible to fix effort of workers ex ante, firms
are not willing to accept underbidding by outsiders: Once employed, the new workers would adopt the reference
wage of insiders and thus reduce their effort when the wage paid by the firm falls short of the wage considered to
be fair (see Fehr and Falk, 1999).
20In the borderline case θ = 0, firm-level operating profits have zero weight in the determination of the fair
wage, Eq. (26) simplifies to ŵ = w, and the model collapses to the full employment version.
21Evidence on international rent sharing within a firm but across country borders has been documented e.g.
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There is one additional important mechanism in our model that arises due to firm-level rent
sharing: for an offshoring firm, there is a feedback effect on firm-level marginal costs in the source
country, since higher operating profits lead to higher firm-level wage rates via fair wage constraint
(26). This implies that the input ratio changes more strongly in favour of the imported routine
task, and the international relocation effect identified in Section 3.1 is therefore more strongly
negative than in the full employment model, now equaling η/κ(ξ/ξ̄) instead of η/κ. However, the
functional relationships between χ, welfare and the two inequality measures in Section 3 remain
to be given by Eqs. (22) to (25), with the mere difference that ξ̄ replaces ξ.22 As a consequence,
the comparative static effects of offshoring on aggregate welfare and on income inequality among
entrepreneurs as well as between entrepreneurs and workers remains qualitatively the same in
the more sophisticated model variant considered here, and Propositions 1 and 2 continue to
hold. This allows us to focus on the labour market side of our model in the subsequent analysis.
In the presence of firm-level rent sharing, L is the mass of individuals looking for employment
as production workers in the source country, while the mass of employed production workers
is now given by (1 − U)L. Neither entrepreneurs nor offshoring agents can be unemployed,
and therefore the economy-wide unemployment rate in the source country is given by u ≡
UL/N . When looking at u/ua, it is helpful to consider separately the effect of offshoring on
the unemployment rate of production workers, measured by U/Ua, and the effect on the supply
of production labour due to adjustments in the occupational choice, measured by L/La.23 As
shown in the Appendix, the unemployment rate of production workers is given by
U =
θξ̄ + [1 − ∆(χ; η)](k − ξ̄)



















by Budd, Konings, and Slaughter (2005).
22A detailed discussion on how firm-level rent-sharing alters the equations in Section 2 is deferred to a supple-
ment, which is available upon request.
23The importance of occupational choice for understanding how a country’s labour market absorbs the conse-
quences of trade and offshoring has recently been pointed out by Liu and Trefler (2011) and Artuç and McLaren
(2012).
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and α(χ; η) has been defined in Eq. (13). It is easily checked that ∆(0, η) = 1, and therefore U is
lower in an equilibrium with offshoring than in autarky if ∆(χ; η) > 1 and higher than in autarky
if ∆(χ; η) < 1. The effect of offshoring on L follows directly from Eq. (18), and as discussed in
Subsection 3.1, the supply of production labour is smaller in an offshoring equilibrium than in
autarky. By reducing L, this effect reduces aggregate unemployment u, ceteris paribus. Putting
together these partial effects leads to
u
ua
= Λ(χ; η), with Λ(χ; η) ≡
θξ̄ + [1 − ∆(χ; η)](k − ξ̄)
θξ̄
γ(χ; η)(kρσ + k − ξ̄)
γ(χ; η)kρσ + k − ξ̄
, (29)
where ua can be computed from Eqs. (18) and (27). The first fraction of Λ is equal to U/Ua
and the second fraction is equal to L/La. Unemployment rate u is lower with χ > 0 than with
χ = 0 if Λ(χ; η) < 1, while the opposite is true if Λ(χ; η) > 1. We show the following result:
Proposition 3 Unemployment in the source country decreases with the share of offshoring firms
at low levels of χ. Under the sufficient condition η ≥ 1/2 the effect is reversed as more firms
offshore, and unemployment surpasses its autarky level if χ is sufficiently large.
Proof See the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since the labour supply effect works unambigu-
ously in favour of a reduction in overall unemployment, all potentially harmful employment
effects must work via an increase in the unemployment rate of production workers U . This
effect is analysed most easily by noting that due to the indifference condition for the marginal
entrepreneur, Eq. (9), and the fair wage constraint, Eq. (26), there is a direct link in any equi-
librium with χ < 1 between U , the average wage for production labour w̄ and the wage paid by





and hence if U changes w̄/w(ϕc) has to change in the same direction: an increase in w̄, which
makes entrepreneurship less attractive, has to be compensated by an increase in U in order to
restore indifference. Now consider an increase in χ, starting from zero. The newly offshoring
firms in this scenario are the high-productivity firms paying high wages, and their domestic
employment levels fall unambiguously due to the international relocation effect (as noted before,
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κ is close to 1 if χ is close to zero, and therefore the productivity effect is small), resulting in a
decrease in the domestic average wage w̄. Hence, for low levels of offshoring U decreases with
an increase in χ, and so does the aggregate unemployment rate u.
The effect of a marginal increase in offshoring on U is reversed at high levels of χ, since now
the newly offshoring firms have low productivity and pay low wages, and since the international
relocation effect reduces the weight their wage has in the domestic average wage, w̄ increases.24
Hence, the unemployment rate of production workers U increases, and overall unemployment is
driven by two opposing effects: the supply of production workers decreases, but a larger share
of them is without a job. If η is large, and hence the international relocation effect is small, the
negative impact of offshoring on U dominates the decline in L at high levels of χ.25
The ratio w̄/w(ϕc) provides one measure of income inequality among production workers, but
not a very informative one, since it ignores information on individual wage rates by everybody
but the workers in the marginal firm. Hence, in analogy to the measurement of entrepreneurial
income inequality we now look at the Gini coefficient as a more sophisticated measure of wage
dispersion. As formally shown in the Appendix, this Gini coefficient is given by
AL(χ) =
θξ̄




























Inequality of wage income is the same in the polar cases where either no firms or all firms








.26 We can furthermore show that AL is
24This is different only in the limiting case of η = 0. In this case, all tasks are routine, and therefore if a
firm moves tasks abroad, all domestic production jobs of this firm are lost. As a consequence, with each newly
offshoring firm the source country loses its highest-paying domestic production jobs, and therefore w̄ decreases
monotonically with an increase in χ, leading to a monotonic decrease in U .
25In the limiting case of η → 1, χ loses its impact on the supply of production labour L/La. At the same time,
a larger share of offshoring firms increases the unemployment rate of production workers, i.e. dU/dχ > 0, because
offshoring firms have to pay higher wages in the source country and thus reduce employment in the non-routine
task.
26An analogous result holds for the trade models of Egger and Kreickemeier (2009, 2012) and Helpman, Itskhoki,
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lower than the autarky level at low levels of offshoring, and higher than the autarky level at
high levels of offshoring. Figure 3 illustrates the resulting S-shape of the AL locus, alongside the
Gini-coefficient for entrepreneurial income AM that we computed in the previous section, with















Figure 3: Gini coefficients for entrepreneurial income and wage income
The intuition is analogous to the one for the effect of offshoring on w̄/w(ϕc). In a situation
where the offshoring strategy is only chosen by the most productive firms, the international
relocation effect shifts high-wage jobs abroad, and this effect is responsible for the reduction
of wage inequality at low levels of χ. The influence of the relocation effect is reversed at high
levels of χ, since now the low-productivity firms shift low-wage jobs abroad, thereby contributing
and Redding (2010), where wage inequality is the same in the cases of autarky and exporting by all firms.
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to an increase in wage inequality in the source country. There is also a firm-level wage effect
due to the rent-sharing mechanism in our model: it increases wage dispersion at low levels of χ
(wage-boosting increase in profits by high-wage firms) and reduces wage dispersion at high levels
of χ (wage-boosting increase in profits by low-wage firms). The firm-level wage effect thereby
influences wage inequality in the opposite direction to the international relocation effect, and it
dominates the overall effect when many firms offshore.
The following proposition summarizes the main insights regarding the distributional effects
of offshoring within the group of (employed) production workers.
Proposition 4 The impact of offshoring on the dispersion of wage income, measured by the Gini
coefficient, is non-monotonic. Wage income inequality falls relative to the benchmark without
offshoring if χ is small, while it rises relative to this benchmark if χ is sufficiently large.
Proof Analysis in the text and formal discussion in the Appendix.
5 A calibration exercise
In this section, we use the extended version of our model from Section 4 to quantify the im-
plications of offshoring for welfare, employment, and income distribution in the source country.
For this purpose, we calibrate the model, using parameter estimates from the empirical trade
literature. A useful starting point are the findings in Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011),
who conduct a structural empirical estimation of the Egger and Kreickemeier (2012) model.
Employing information from the Amadeus data-set, Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier (2011) re-
port the following parameter estimates for the average country in their data-set, which covers
five European economies: θ = 0.102, σ = 6.698, k = 4.306. While, to the best of our knowledge,
there are no other directly comparable estimates for the rent-sharing parameter available, the
estimate of σ lies in the range of parameter estimates reported by Broda and Weinstein (2006)
and is well in line with the parameter value considered by Arkolakis (2010) in his calibration
exercise. The parameter estimate of k is higher than the estimate of 2 reported by Del Gatto,
Mion, and Ottaviano (2006). However, it is consistent with findings by Arkolakis and Muendler
(2010) and – together with the estimates for θ and σ – guarantees that the parameter constraint
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k > ξ̄ is fulfilled. Regarding the share of offshorable tasks, we consider the findings by Blinder
(2009) and Blinder and Krueger (2012) and set η = 0.75.
Table 1: Impact of offshoring on welfare, unemployment, inequality
Change of
χ I in pct. u in ppt. ω̃ in pct. AM in pct. AL in pct.
0.01 −0.827 −2.654 0.837 0.322 −6.910
0.10 2.067 −0.944 8.369 2.860 −0.488
0.25 7.202 0.898 20.922 5.902 2.270
0.50 15.222 2.560 41.844 8.626 2.362
0.75 22.564 3.502 62.766 9.395 1.224
0.90 26.692 3.839 75.319 9.211 0.477
Notes: All reported figures, except of the one for unemployment, refer to percentage changes
relative to autarky. In the case of unemployment, figures refer to changes in percentage
points.
We then compute how a given exposure to offshoring alters our variables of interest relative
to a benchmark without offshoring. The results from this exercise are summarised in Table 1.
We see that using our parameter estimates the decline in I at low levels of χ is only small, while
for larger values of χ offshoring exerts a sizable positive welfare effect in the source country.
Furthermore, offshoring widens the income gap between entrepreneurs and workers significantly,
and it generates ‘managerial superstars’ by increasing income inequality within the group of
entrepreneurs (see Manasse and Turrini, 2001; Gersbach and Schmutzler, 2007). As outlined in
Section 4, offshoring exerts a non-monotonic effect on the distribution of wage income. Evaluated
at our parameter estimates, the model suggests that offshoring has only moderate effects on
unemployment and intra-group inequality among production workers.
As guidance for what constitutes an empirically plausible share of exporting firms we use
the results from Moser, Urban, and Weder di Mauro (2009). Using a large sample of 8,466
German plants from the IAB Establishment Panel, they find that the share of offshoring firms
is 14.9 percent. This share is somewhat lower than the share of offshoring firms reported by
The Economist (2004) from a small survey of 150 British firms, while it is significantly higher
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than the share of firms conducting international outsourcing and/or FDI in Japan as reported
by Tomiura (2007). Evaluated at χ = 0.149, our model predicts that the observed pattern of
offshoring has increased welfare in Germany by 3.8 percent and at the same time has widened
the gap between entrepreneurial income and wages by 12.5 percent. Furthermore, offshoring has
increased inequality within the group of entrepreneurs by 4 percent and inequality within the
group of production workers by 0.9 percent. In contrast to the widespread perception of large
negative employment effects, our model predicts that offshoring has lowered unemployment in
Germany by 0.2 percentage points.
6 Alternative measures of inequality
In this section, we extend the analysis of the link between offshoring and inequality in three
directions. First, we include the two groups left out of the analysis of intra-group inequality
so far – namely the freelance offshoring agents and the unemployed production workers, where
the latter group only exists in the version of our model with firm-level rent sharing. Second,
we analyse the effect of offshoring on the Lorenz curves for group-specific incomes to assess the
robustness of our earlier analysis using Gini coefficients. Third, we look at the effect of offshoring
on economy-wide inequality.27
For the mentioned more comprehensive view of intra-group inequality, we combine en-
trepreneurs with freelance offshoring agents, thereby creating the group of self-employed agents,
leaving everybody else – employed and unemployed production workers – for the second broadly













In analogy to Eq. (24), the inequality measure in Eq. (31) applies in the basic model variant
without rent sharing, and it can be adapted to the extended model with rent sharing by simply
replacing ξ by ξ̄. Differentiating (31), we find A′S(χ) > 0, and hence inequality in the broadly
27In the interest of readability, we keep the analysis in the section informal and refer readers who are interested
in a more formal discussion to a supplement, which is available upon request.
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defined group of all self-employed agents increases monotonically with χ. From a comparison
between (24) and (31), we can furthermore conclude that AM (χ) > AS(χ) holds for all χ > 0.
This implies that inequality within the group of all self-employed agents is less pronounced than
inequality within the subgroup of entrepreneurs.
In the extended model with firm-level rent sharing, the Gini coefficient for income of all
production workers, including those who are unemployed, is given by
AU (χ) = U + (1 − U)AL (χ) (32)
and thus larger than AL (χ). Since U is smaller than U
a at low levels of χ, while the reverse is
true at high levels of χ, the non-monotonic effect of χ on AL(χ) extends to AU (χ). However,
there is one important difference between the two indices. The Gini coefficient for the income
of all production workers does not fall back to its autarky level if all firms offshore. The reason
is that the unemployment rate of production workers is higher at high levels of χ than under
autarky, and this increases AU (χ) ceteris paribus. As a consequence, AU (1) > AU (0), whereas
AL(1) = AL(0).
In order to assess the robustness of our results with respect to the use of alternative measures
of inequality, we analyse the effect of offshoring on the Lorenz curves for group-specific incomes.
The main insight from this analysis is that the income distribution for self-employed agents in
autarky Lorenz dominates the respective income distribution under offshoring. Since Lorenz
dominance is equivalent to mean-preserving second-order stochastic dominance, our previous
insight regarding the impact of offshoring on income inequality within the group of self-employed
agents extends to all inequality measures that respect second-order stochastic dominance –
including, for instance, the Gini coefficient or the Theil index. Regarding the relationship
between offshoring and inequality within the broadly defined group of production workers, we
find that for high levels of χ the distribution of labour income with offshoring Lorenz dominates
the respective distribution under autarky, while the opposite is true if χ is close to zero. This
implies that the non-monotonicity in the impact of χ on the distribution of labour income
extends to all other measures of inequality that respect second-order stochastic dominance.28
28For intermediate levels of χ, Lorenz curves for the scenarios with and without offshoring can intersect, implying
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In a final step of our analysis, we are interested in the impact of offshoring on economy-
wide inequality. For this purpose, we have to find a comprehensive measure of inequality. A
particularly useful metric in this respect is the Theil index, which is decomposable in the sense
that it can be written as a weighted average of inequality within subgroups, plus inequality
between these subgroups (cf. Shorrocks, 1980). More specifically, in our model the Theil index
















where TS , TU are the Theil indices for the income distributions of self-employed agents and all
production workers, respectively, while
aS ≡
1 − ρ
ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
, aU ≡
ργ(χ; η)
ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
, (34)
are the income shares of the two subgroups of population. While we can show that offshoring
raises Theil index T and hence economy-wide income inequality in the benchmark case without
firm-level rent sharing (θ = 0), this result does not extend in general to the more sophisticated
model variant with positive levels of θ, as the following simulation exercise shows by way of a
counter-example.
Using the parameter estimates from the previous section, we can quantify the impact of
offshoring on the different measures of inequality analysed above. The main insights from this
calibration exercise are summarised in Table 2. This table reports changes (relative to autarky)
in the Gini coefficients AS(χ), AU (χ) (columns 2 and 3), the group-specific Theil indices TS , TU
(columns 4 and 5), and the economy-wide Theil index T (column 6) for different levels of χ.
Thereby, columns 2 and 4 confirm our previous insight that offshoring makes the distribution
of income of self-employed agents more unequal, while the figures in columns 3 and 5 depict
the non-monotonicity in the effect of offshoring on labour income inequality. Finally, column 6
indicates a positive impact of offshoring on economy-wide income inequality. However, evaluated
that the distributions of labour income for χ = 0 and χ > 0 cannot be ranked according to the criterion of second-
order stochastic dominance. In this case, it cannot be ruled out that different metrics of inequality – such as the
Gini coefficient or the Theil index – lead to different results regarding the impact of offshoring on labour income
inequality.
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at our parameter estimates, offshoring lowers economy-wide income inequality if χ is sufficiently
close to zero. For instance, the economy-wide Theil index T falls by 0.2 percent, if the source
country of offshoring moves from autarky to χ = 0.001.
Table 2: Impact of offshoring on different measures of inequality
Change of
χ AS in pct. AU in pct. TS in pct. TU in pct. T in pct.
0.01 0.320 −6.354 0.018 −2.729 2.599
0.10 2.697 −1.411 0.169 −0.682 11.742
0.25 5.220 2.588 0.525 1.178 18.741
0.50 7.250 5.573 1.434 2.785 24.405
0.75 7.990 6.840 2.626 3.593 27.078
0.90 8.133 7.233 3.432 3.883 27.982
Notes: All reported figures refer to percentage changes relative to autarky.
We complete the discussion in this section, by quantifying the impact of observed levels of
offshoring for income inequality in Germany. As outlined in Section 5, about 14.9 percent of
German firms undertake offshoring, with moderate effects on income inequality. To be more
specific, according to our calibration exercise, the observed pattern of offshoring has increased
the Gini coefficient for the income of self-employed agents by 3.7 percent, while the Theil index
for this income group has been raised by just 0.3 percent. The impact of the observed pattern
of offshoring on income inequality of production workers is even less pronounced and amounts
to 0.2 according to the Gini criterion, while it is almost zero when applying the metric of the
Theil index. Despite the small impact of offshoring on measures of intra-group inequality, our
calibration results point to a considerable increase in economy-wide income inequality, with the
respective Theil index increasing by 14.6 percent. This is in line with our previous insight that
offshoring exerts relatively strong inter-group effects.
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7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed an analytically tractable general equilibrium framework for
analysing offshoring to low-wage countries. It is a key feature of our framework that firms differ
from each other in terms of their productivity. As a consequence, the costly option to offshore
routine tasks to the low-wage country, while available to all firms, is chosen only by a subset
of them in equilibrium. The effects that offshoring has on welfare and the income distribution
depends on the share of firms that offshore tasks in equilibrium, and we are therefore able to
show that considering firm heterogeneity adds a relevant dimension to the established offshoring
literature that has mainly focused on the heterogeneity of tasks.
The model is analytically tractable, although the wages in both countries are determined
endogenously. We buy analytical tractability by making the strong assumption that the option
of becoming an entrepreneur is open only to individuals in one of the countries. This country is
therefore the headquarters location of all firms, making it the source country of offshoring, while
the other country is the host country of offshoring, with all employment in the performance
of routine tasks for firms in the source country. The host country emerges endogenously as
the low-wage country, since offshoring involves both a fixed and a variable cost, and hence for
offshoring to be profitable firm-level wage rates have to be lower than in the source country.
With this deliberately simple modelling of the host country, our interest is focused on the effects
of offshoring in the source country.
Whereas income inequality between entrepreneurs and workers increases monotonically with
the share of offshoring firms, we find that offshoring has a non-monotonic effect on income
inequality among entrepreneurs: income inequality within this group increases if only a few
firms shift the production of routine tasks abroad and decreases (while always staying above
the autarky level) if offshoring becomes common practice among high and low productivity
firms. Furthermore, offshoring may exert a positive or negative effect on aggregate welfare in
the source country: Welfare decreases relative to autarky if only a small share of firms offshore
their routine tasks to the low-wage country, while it is higher than in autarky if this share is
large. Low offshoring shares are the result of high offshoring costs, and in this situation only
the high-productivity firms offshore their routine tasks. This leads to the loss of jobs in the
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most productive firms in the source country, and the workers are forced to seek employment in
other firms, while some opt for opening new firms. The latter effect is welfare decreasing, since
already the autarky equilibrium has too many firms from a social planner’s point of view. The
effect is reversed if offshoring costs are low, and therefore many firms move their routine tasks
offshore.
In an extension with firm-level rent sharing, which preserves all results derived in the bench-
mark model with perfectly competitive labour markets, our model allows us to address the
public concern that offshoring invariably destroys domestic jobs. Our analysis shows that it
is important to distinguish between what happens at the level of offshoring firms (firm-level
effect) and what happens in the aggregate, after taking into account general equilibrium effects.
We find that firm-level employment of production workers and aggregate employment tend do
move in opposite directions: Aggregate employment increases unambiguously at low levels of χ,
where the negative firm-level effects on source country employment are largest. The reverse is
true at high levels of χ: Firm level employment of production workers goes up, while aggregate
employment falls. The key to understanding this result lies in the occupational choice mech-
anism at the heart of our model: Individuals losing their jobs in newly-offshored tasks either
find employment as offshoring agents, or they decide to become entrepreneurs, for whom the
reservoir of available production workers makes it now worthwhile to run a firm themselves. The
offshoring of domestic jobs may therefore result in a decrease of domestic unemployment under
precisely those circumstances where one would expect it least if guided by firm-level effects. The
model extension with rent sharing also leads to richer distributional effects, and we show that
intra-group inequality within the group of production workers is affected by offshoring in a non-
monotonic way, being lower than in autarky if only the most productive firms find it attractive
to shift the production of routine tasks abroad, and higher than in autarky if offshoring becomes
common practice among high and low productivity firms.
To round off the analysis in this paper, we have conducted a calibration exercise for our model
variant with firm-level rent sharing, in order to quantify the implications of offshoring. Relying
on parameter estimates from the empirical trade literature, our model predicts strong positive
welfare effects and sizable distributional consequences between entrepreneurs and workers as well
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as within the group of entrepreneurs, whereas the consequences of offshoring for unemployment
and inequality within the group of workers are moderate. We have also aggregated the different
income groups to arrive at a comprehensive measure of economy-wide income inequality and
have evaluated this comprehensive measure at the parameter estimates at hand. The insights
from this exercise indicate that the movement from autarky to observed patterns of offshoring
has significantly increased economy-wide income inequality in the source country.
A Appendix
A.1 Offshoring and welfare in the source country
In the main text, we claim that raising χ from zero to a small positive level exerts a negative
impact on Φ(χ). To show this effect, we can differentiate Φ(χ). According to (23), this gives
Φ′(χ) =
σΦ(χ)




1 − ξ + (σ − 1)γ(χ; η)































k + σ − 1
k(σ − 1)
. (A.2)
Noting that σ > ξ and that limχ→0 ∂γ(χ; η)/∂χ = −∞, it follows that Φ
′(0) < 0.
In the main text, we also claim that Φ′(χ) > 0 and Φ(χ) > 1 hold for sufficiently high levels
of χ if η ≥ 1/2. To show that η ≥ 1/2 implies Φ(1) > 1, it is useful to rewrite (23) as follows
Φ(χ) =
{
[1 + (σ − 1)γ (χ; η)] (σ − ξ/k)










(1 + χ) [γ (χ; η) k(σ − 1) + k − ξ]







It is easily confirmed that T1 (χ) > 1, T2(χ) > 1 hold for any χ > 0. Accordingly, T3(1) ≥ 1 is
sufficient for Φ(1) > 1. Noting that T3(1) >,=, < 1 is equivalent to k−ξ >,=, < k(σ−1)(1−2η),
therefore implies that η ≥ 1/2 is sufficient for Φ(1) > 1.
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Finally, to show that Φ′(1) > 0 if η ≥ 1/2, it is useful to consider
Φ′(1) =
(σ − 1) (k − ξ) (1 − η)




[1 + (σ − 1) η] (k + σ − 1)
(σ − 1)2 (k − ξ) (1 − η)
−
1 − ξ + (σ − 1) η
ηk (σ − 1) + k − ξ
>
1
(σ − 1) (k − ξ) (1 − η)
−
1
ηk (σ − 1) + k − ξ
,
(A.5)
according to (A.1). Noting that (σ − 1) [ηk − (1 − η) (k − ξ)] + k − ξ > 0 ∀ η ≥ 1/2, therefore
implies B > 0, and thus Φ′ (1) > 0. This completes the proof. QED.
A.2 Derivation of the Gini coefficient in equation (24)
For characterizing the Gini coefficient in (24), we must distinguish between firms which offshore
and those that produce only domestically. Cumulative profits of purely domestic firms with
productivity ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕc, ϕo) are given by Ψ(ϕ̄) ≡ N
∫ ϕ̄
ϕc π
d(ϕ)dG (ϕ). Considering πd (ϕ) /πd(ϕc) =











Economy-wide profit income is given by Ψ = M(1 + χ) [k/ (k − ξ)]πd(ϕc) − Mχs. Accounting
for s = πd(ϕc) from (9), gives Ψ = Mπd(ϕc)(k + χξ)/(k − ξ). The share of cumulative profits













Denoting the fraction of firms with a productivity level ϕ ≤ ϕ̄ by µ ≡ 1 − (ϕ̄/ϕc)−k, equation











which is relevant for parameter domain µ ∈ [0, 1 − χ).
We now follow the same steps as above to calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve
for the distribution of profit income. We can first note that cumulative profits of all firms with
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Accounting for πd (ϕ) /πd(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)ξ from (8) and πo(ϕ)/πd(ϕ) = 1 +χξ/k, according to (7)
and (11), we can calculate





























Dividing the latter by economy-wide profit income Ψ gives the share of profit income accruing
to entrepreneurs with an ability up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕo,∞):
Ψ(ϕ̄)
Ψ































Substituting µ from above, (A.10) can be reformulated to the second segment of the Lorenz
curve, which is relevant for µ ∈ (1 − χ, 1]
Q2M (µ) = Q
1















(k − ξ) (µ− 1 + χ)
k + ξχ
, (A.11)
with Q2M (1 − χ) = Q
1






Q1M(µ) if µ ∈ [0, 1 − χ)
Q2M(µ) if µ ∈ [1 − χ, 1]
. (A.12)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of profit income in (24) can then be calculated according
to AM (χ) ≡ 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 QM (µ)dµ. QED
A.3 Derivation of Eq. (27)
Adding up domestic employment over all purely domestic and offshoring firms in the source coun-
try gives (1 − U)L = N
[∫ ϕo
ϕc l
d (ϕ) dG (ϕ) +
∫∞
ϕo l
o (ϕ) dG (ϕ)
]
. Using ld (ϕ) /ld(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)(1−θ)ξ̄
and lo (ϕ) /ld(ϕc) = ηκ(σ−1)(1−θ) (ϕ/ϕc)(1−θ)ξ̄, according to (6), (8), the equivalent of (21) for
the scenario with θ > 0, and (26), and accounting for the definition of β(χ; η) in (28), we can
calculate
(1 − U)L = ld(ϕc)β(χ; η)
k
k − (1 − θ)ξ̄
. (A.13)
29The Lorenz curve in (A.12) has the usual properties: QM (0) = 0, QM (1) = 1 and Q
′
M (µ) > 0 ∀ µ ∈ (0, 1).
38
Furthermore, combining (9′), (12), (14) and noting that constant markup pricing implies (σ −
1)π(ϕc) = ld(ϕc)wd(ϕc), we can express the total wage bill in the source country as follows:




Together (A.13) and (A.14) determine the wage ratio w(ϕc)/w̄ = ∆(χ; η)(k − ξ̄)/[k − (1 − θ)ξ̄],
where ∆(χ; η) = β(χ; η)/α(χ; η) has been considered. Applying the fair-wage constraint (26) for
the marginal firm and considering indifference condition (9), we can compute U = 1 −w(ϕc)/w̄.
Substituting for w(ϕc)/w̄, then gives (27). QED
A.4 Offshoring and unemployment rate u
Let us first consider the impact of offshoring on U . From Eqs. (13) and (28), we can conclude
that, for all χ ∈ (0, 1], ∆(χ; η) >,=, < 1 is equivalent to Ω(ζ) ≡ (ηζ1−θ −1) (ζ − 1)θ −(ηζ − 1) >
,=, < 0, with ζ ≡ 1+χξ̄/k ∈ (1, 2]. Differentiating Ω(ζ) gives Ω′(ζ) = −η[1−(1−θ)ζ−θ(ζ−1)θ]+
θ (ζ − 1)θ−1 (ηζ1−θ − 1) and Ω′′(ζ) = θ(1 − θ)(ζ − 1)θ−2[1 − η/ζ1+θ]. Accounting for Ω′′(ζ) > 0
and Ω′(2) = −η(1 − 2−θ) − θ(1 − η2−θ) < 0, it follows that Ω′(ζ) < 0 must hold for all ζ ∈ (1, 2).
Noting finally that Ω(1) = 1 − η > 0 and Ω(2) = −2η[1 − (1/2)θ ] < 0, we can define a unique
χ̂ ∈ (0, 1), such that offshoring lowers U if χ < χ̂, while it raises U if χ > χ̂.
From inspection of (29) we can note that Λ > 1 requires ∆ < 1 and thus a positive effect of
offshoring on U . This implies that Λ(χ; η) > 1 can only materialize if χ > χ̂. Furthermore, it is
































Additionally accounting for ∂γ (χ; η) /∂η > 0, it follows from (29) that ∂Λ (χ; η) /∂η > 0. We
finally show that η ≥ 1/2 is sufficient for Λ(1; η) > 1. For this purpose, we can note that
λ(1; 1/2) >,=, < 0 if Λ̂(θ) ≡ (1 − 2−θ)(kσ − ξ̄) − θξ̄ >,=, < 0. In view of ∂λ(1, η)/∂η > 0,
this implies that λ̂(θ) ≥ 0 is sufficient for Λ(1; η) > 0 if η ≥ 1/2. Differentiating Λ̂(θ) gives
Λ̂′(θ) = 2−θ ln 2(kσ− ξ̄)+ ξ̄2[1−2−θ −θ+1−1/(σ−1)]. It is noteworthy that ξ̄ ≥ 1 is equivalent
to 1 ≥ θ+1/(σ−1), and hence implies Λ̂′(θ) > 0. Accounting for Λ̂(0) = 0, we can thus conclude
that Λ̂(θ) holds for all θ-levels that are consistent with ξ̄ ≥ 1. But what happens if ξ̄ < 1? In
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this case, Λ̂(θ) might have an extremum at some θ̂ ∈ (0, 1). Evaluating the second derivative
of Λ̂(θ) at θ̂, we obtain Λ̂′′(θ̂) = −21−θ̂ ln 2ξ̄(kσ − 2ξ̄) − ξ̄2 − 2−θ̂ ln 2(kσ − ξ̄). Accounting for
σ > 1 + ξ̄, we get kσ − ξ̄ > k + (k − 1)ξ̄ and thus Λ̂′′(θ̂) < 0. Hence, if Λ̂(θ) has an extremum,
this extremum must be a maximum. Noting finally that Λ̂(0) = 0 and Λ̂′(0) > 0, it follows
that30 Λ̂(1) = (2σ)−1
[
kσ2 − 3(σ − 1)
]
> 0 is sufficient for Λ̂(θ) ≥ 0. Recollecting from above
that Λ(χ; η) < 1 holds if χ ≤ χ̂, u/ua must be non-monotonic in χ if η ≥ 1/2, because in this
case, we have Λ(1; η) ≥ 1. This completes the proof. QED
A.5 Derivation of the Gini coefficient in equation (30)
To characterize the Gini coefficient for the distribution of wage income we must distinguish
workers employed in purely domestic firms from those employed in offshoring firms. Cumulative
labour income of workers employed in purely domestic firms with a productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈
[ϕc, ϕo) is given by W (ϕ̄) ≡ N
∫ ϕo
ϕc w(ϕ)l(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Since constant markup pricing implies that
a firm’s wage bill is proportional to its revenues, we can make use of wd(ϕ)ld(ϕ) = (σ− 1)πd(ϕ).
Considering πd(ϕ)/πd(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)ξ̄ from (8), then implies








Total economy-wide labour income equals W = ργ(χ; η)Y . Using the definition of γ(χ; η), (13)
and (14), we obtain W = (σ − 1)Mπd(ϕc)[k/(k − ξ̄)]α(χ; η). Hence, the share of wage income














To calculate the Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income, we must link the income ratio
in (A.17) to the respective employment ratio. For this purpose, we first note that total employ-











Substituting ld(ϕ)/ld(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)(1−θ)ξ̄ , we can calculate
L(ϕ̄) = Mld(ϕc)
k








In a similar vein, we can show that economy-wide employment of production workers in the
source country equals (1−U)L = Mld(ϕc)β(χ; η)k/[k−(1−θ)ξ̄]. Hence, the share of production
workers that are employed in firms with a productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕc, ϕo) is given by
λ = β(χ; η)−1[1−(ϕ̄/ϕc)(1−θ)ξ̄−k]. Combining the latter with (A.17), we obtain the first segment
of the Lorenz curve for the distribution of labour income
Q1L (λ) =











We now follow the same steps as above to calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve.
We first compute the total domestic wage bill of firms with a productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕo,∞).
This gives W (ϕ̄) ≡ W (ϕo)+N
∫ ϕ̄
ϕo w
o(ϕ)lo(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Accounting for wo(ϕ)lo(ϕ) = η(σ−1)πo(ϕ)
and considering πd(ϕ)/πd(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)ξ̄ from (8) as well as πo(ϕ)/πd(ϕ) = 1 + χξ̄/k, according
to (7) and (11), we can calculate

































The mass of domestic workers employed by firms with a productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕo,∞)
is given by L(ϕ̄) = L(ϕo) + N
∫ ϕ̄
ϕo l
o(ϕ)dG(ϕ). Accounting for lo(ϕ)/ld(ϕ) = ηκ(σ−1)(1−θ) =
η(1 + χξ̄/k)1−θ and ld(ϕ)/ld(ϕc) = (ϕ/ϕc)(1−θ)ξ̄ , we can further write
























. Solving the latter for ϕ̄/ϕc and substituting the resulting expression
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into (A.21), we obtain the second segment of the Lorenz curve



























Q1L(λ) if λ ∈ [0, bL)
Q2L(λ) if λ ∈ [bL, 1]
. (A.24)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of labour income in (30) can then be calculated according
to AL(χ) ≡ 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 QL(λ)dλ. QED
A.6 The properties of Gini coefficient AL
From the definitions of α(χ; η), β(χ; η) and inspection of (30), it follows that AL(1) = AL(0).
Furthermore, if χ ∈ (0, 1), the sign of AL(χ) −AL(0) is equivalent to the sign of
δ(χ; η) ≡
k − ξ̄


















































holds for any possible χ ∈ (0, 1), it is straightforward to show that δ(χ; η) > 0 must hold if
η(1 + χξ̄/k) ≥ 1, or, equivalently, if χ ≥ [(1 − η)/η]k/ξ̄.
But what is the sign of δ(χ; η) if χ < [(1 − η)/η]k/ξ̄? Or, more specifically, since we
know that χ must be smaller than one: What is the sign of δ(χ; η) if χ < χ̄, where χ̄ ≡
min{[(1 − η)/η]k/ξ̄ , 1} and thus χ̄ = 1 if η ≤ 1/2, while χ̄ = [(1 − η)/η]k/ξ̄ if η > 1/2? To
answer this question, we can first note that if χ < χ̄, condition δ(χ; η) >,=, < 0 is equivalent to
31The Lorenz curve in (A.24) has the usual properties: QL(0) = 0, QL(1) = 1 and Q
′
L(λ) > 0 ∀ λ ∈ (0, 1)
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) , δ1(χ) ≡
k − ξ̄













It is easily confirmed δ0(χ; η) increases in χ over the relevant interval, reaching a minimum
function value of δ0(0; η) = 1 at χ = 0. Accordingly, δ0(χ; η) reaches a maximum function
value at χ̄. This maximum function value is given by (1 − 21−θη)/ (1 − 2η) if η ≤ 1/2, while it
equals ∞ if η > 1/2. In a similar way, we can show that δ1(χ) is decreasing in χ, reaching a
maximum function value of ∞ at χ = 0 and a minimum function value of 1 at χ = 1. Putting
together, this implies that there exists a unique χ̂(η) such that δ0(χ; η) >,=, < δ1(χ) and thus
δ(χ; η) >,=, < 0 if χ >,=, < χ̂(η). Finally, accounting for ∂δ0(χ; η)/∂η > 0, it follows that χ̂(η)
shrinks in η and reaches a minimum value of 0 at η = 1. In this case δ(χ; 0) > 0 holds for any
χ ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, χ̂(η) reaches a maximum value of 1 at η = 0, implying that in this case
δ(χ; 0) < 0 must hold for any χ ∈ (0, 1). This completes the formal discussion of the properties
of AL. QED
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Supplement
(Not intended for publication)
If not stated differently, the formal analysis in this supplement refers to the sophisticated model
variant with θ > 0.
Derivation details for the model variant with θ > 0
In this subsection, we show in detail how the equations in Section 2 must be modified, when
allowing for rent sharing between workers and firms. The first equation that has to be modified











where ωn(v) is the domestic wage rate paid by firm v to workers conducting non-routine tasks.
Thereby, we have ωn(v) = wd(v) if the firm produces all tasks at home, while we have ωn(v) =
wo(v) if routine tasks are produced offshore. As in Section 2, we have z(v) = 1 and thus
cd(v) = wd(v)/ϕ if the firm produces purely domestically. For an offshoring firm, we obtain















Thereby, we have made use of the fair-wage constraint in (26) in order to substitute for wo(v)/w∗(v).




















Using (8) and (S.3) in indifference condition (10), and accounting for πd(ϕc) = s from (9′),
we can easily verify that the link between χ and κ remains to be given by (11), with ξ̄ assuming
S1
the role of ξ if θ > 0. Labour income per capita in the source and host country are given by32
(1 − U)w̄ =
γ(χ; η)ρY
L
and (1 − U∗)w̄∗ =
[1 − γ(χ; η)] ρY
N∗
, (S.5)





γ (χ; η) kρσ + k − ξ̄











And combining (11) and (S.6) we can conclude that the relationship between κ and χ in the
model variant with θ > 0 is characterized by the implicit function




γ (χ; η) kρσ + k − ξ̄


















This completes our discussion on how rent sharing affects the equations reported in Section 2.
QED
Existence of involuntary unemployment in an offshoring equilibrium
Involuntary unemployment exists in our model, if U > 0. To show that this is the case in any
offshoring equilibrium with χ ∈ (0, 1), we must prove that ∆(χ; η) < [k−(1−θ)ξ̄]/(k−ξ̄) holds in
the relevant parameter domain (see (27)). Partially differentiating ∆(·) with respect to η, gives
∂∆(·)/∂η < 0, according to (A.15), and we can therefore safely conclude that ∆(χ; η) ≤ ∆(χ; 0)









it then follows that ∆̂(χ) < [k − (1 − θ)ξ̄]/(k − ξ̄) is sufficient for involuntary unemployment to
exist in equilibrium. Differentiating ∆̂(χ) yields ∆̂′(χ) = χ−ξ̄/k ι̂(χ)/(1 − χ1−ξ̄/k)2, with
ι̂(χ) ≡ −



















32Rent sharing affects Eqs. (13)-(19) because ξ̄ assumes the role of ξ if θ > 0, but there are not additional
effects.
S2
Noting that ι̂(0) > 0, ι̂(1) = 0, and ι̂′(χ) < 0, we obtain ∆̂′(χ) > 0, implying that ∆̂(χ) < ∆̂(1)
must hold for any χ ∈ [0, 1). Noting finally that limχ→1 ∆̂(χ) = [k − (1 − θ)ξ̄]/(k − ξ̄), we
can safely conclude that there must be involuntary unemployment in the offshoring equilibrium.
QED
Further details for the derivation of (30)







λ+ (1 − β(χ; η)λ)
2(k−ξ̄)+θξ̄
k−(1−θ)ξ̄
k − (1 − θ)ξ̄[











k − (1 − θ)ξ̄






































k − (1 − θ)ξ̄















k − (1 − θ)ξ̄




Substituting (S.9) and (S.10) into








AL = −1 + 2bL





k − (1 − θ)ξ̄
2(k − ξ̄) + θξ̄

















k − (1 − θ)ξ̄





Using the definition of bL, we can rewrite AL in the following way
AL =
θξ̄




k − (1 − θ)ξ̄
]
[1 − α(χ; η)β(χ; η)]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
[









[α(χ; η) − 1]
α(χ; η)β(χ; η)
+ 2Z(χ; η). (S.14)
Accounting for (13) and (28), we can show that
1 − α(χ; η)β(χ; η) = − [α(χ; η) − 1] − [β(χ; η) − 1] − [α(χ; η) − 1] [β(χ; η) − 1]

























Substituting (S.15) into (S.14), it is straightforward to calculate (30). QED
A continuum of tasks that differ in offshorability
In this extension, we shed light on the firm-internal margin of offshoring, by considering a
continuum of tasks that differ in offshorability, as suggested by Acemoglu and Autor (2011).
For this purpose, we replace production function (3) by
q(v) = ϕ(v) exp
∫ 1
0
ln ℓ(v, η)dη, (S.16)
where ℓ(v, η) is the input of task η ∈ [0, 1] in the production of q(v). Tasks are symmetric
in the labour input they require to be performed and, as in the main text, we impose the
additional assumption that one unit of labour must be employed to produce one unit of task
η. However, as in Grossman and Ross-Hansberg (2008), tasks differ in their offshorability and
this is captured by an iceberg cost parameter t that is task specific: t(η). An intuitive way to
interpret parameter t is to think of it as task-specific trade cost parameter, implying that total
costs of shipping the output of a task η, whose production has been moved offshore, back to
the source country amounts to t(η)τ > 1. To facilitate the analysis, we impose the additional
assumption that t(1) = 1, t(0) = ∞ and t′(η) < 0. This implies that tasks are ranked according
to their offshorability and it allows us to identify a unique firm-specific η̃(v), which separates
the tasks performed at home, η < η̃(v), from the tasks performed abroad η ≥ η̃(v).
S4
Once a firm has decided to engage in offshoring, it is left with two further decisions on
how to organize its production, which are taken in two consecutive stages. In stage one, the
firm chooses how many tasks to move of offshore and sets η̃(v) accordingly, while in stage
two, the firm chooses optimal employment in domestic and offshored tasks. As it is common
practice, we solve this two stage problem through backward induction and first determine the
profit-maximizing employment levels for a given η̃(v). For this purpose, we can recollect from
the main text that wages paid to domestic and foreign workers are given wo(v) and w∗(v),




n(v, η)dη = η̃(v)ℓn(v) and lr(v) =
∫ 1
η̃(v) t (η) ℓ
r (v, η) dη =
∫ 1
η̃(v) t (η) dηℓ
r (v).33
Therefore, firm v’s cost minimisation problem can be expressed as follows:
min
ln(v), lr(v)




]η̃(v) [ lr (v)
1 − η̃ (v)
]1−η̃(v)
, (S.17)




η̃(v) t (η) dη
(S.18)
reflects the average productivity loss arising from the extra labour costs t(η), when produc-
ing a task abroad. Solving maximisation problem (S.17) gives unit production costs c (v) =








At stage one, the firm sets η̃(v) to minimise its unit costs c(v). Thus, for the optimal η̃(v)-
level the following first-order condition must hold: ∂c(v)/∂η̃(v)
!
= 0. In view of (S.18) and
33As in the main text, we define lr(v) such that foreign labour demand of offshoring firm v is given by τ lr(v).
While this definition of lr(v) might seem awkward at a first glance, it is useful for our purpose because it allows
us to directly compare the production technology in (S.17) with the respective technology in (3).





∞ ∀ η ∈ [0, η̃)
1 ∀ η ∈ [η̃, 1]
.
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+ t[η̃(v)]ǫ[η̃ (v)] − 1
!
= 0. (S.20)
Acknowledging Eq. (26) in the main text, we know that wo(v)/w∗(v) is the same for all producers,
and hence Eq. (S.20) determines the same cost-minimising η̃ for all firms, which we denote
by η̃0. Since the second-order condition of the stage one cost-minimisation problem requires
∂2 ln z̃(v)/∂η̃(v)2 < 0, while ∂2 ln z̃(v)/∂η̃(v)∂τ > 0 follows from inspection of (S.20), we can
finally conclude that dη̃0/dτ > 0, and hence firms offshore a lower share of tasks if the costs
of shipping foreign output back to the source country increase. This completes our formal
discussion. QED
Alternative measures of income inequality
While in the main text, we focus on the distribution of wage and entrepreneurial income, we
now take a somewhat broader perspective and add those who do not have a job and those
who become self-employed as service agents to our picture of inequality. For this purpose, we
extend the Gini coefficients from Sections 3 and 4, and define a Gini coefficient for the income
distribution of all production workers (including those who do not have a job) as well as a Gini
coefficient for the income distribution of self-employed agents (including entrepreneurs as well
as freelance agents).
Income inequality among self-employed agents
To characterize income inequality among all self-employed agents, we rely on the Lorenz curve
for this income group, which now has three segments.35 The first segment captures the share of
income attributed to freelance offshoring service providers. It is given by Q0S(µ) = [(k − ξ)/k]µ




. The second segment of the Lorenz curve captures income
of freelance offshoring agents plus cumulative profits of purely domestic firms with a productivity
35In this subsection, we consider the basic model variant without rent sharing. The respective results for the
model variant with rent sharing are obtained when replacing ξ by ξ̄.
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Economy-wide profits plus service fees add up to total operating profits Ψ̂ = Mπd(ϕc)(1 +
χ) [k/ (k − ξ)]. Hence, the cumulative share of (profit income) realised by offshoring agents and


















We have to link (S.22) with the ratio of self-employed agents receiving the respective income
share. Denoting the fraction of these agents by µ ≡ (1 + χ)−1 [χ + 1 − (ϕ̄/ϕc)−k], Eq. (S.22)

















which is relevant for parameter domain µ ∈
[
χ/(1 + χ), 1/(1 + χ)
)
.
In a final step, we compute the cumulative income of all freelance offshoring agents and
entrepreneurs with an ability up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕo,∞) as a share of the total income of self-employed


























χ− (1 + χ)(1 − µ)
]}
. (S.24)






















The Gini coefficient for the distribution of income among self-employed agents can then be
calculated according to AS(χ) ≡ 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 QS(µ)dµ. Substituting (S.25), we can compute (31).
QED
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Income inequality among employed and unemployed production workers
To characterize income inequality among all production workers, we rely on the Lorenz curve
for labour income. Since this Lorenz curve now also captures unemployed individuals, it consists
of three segments. The first segment represents the share of income attributed to those who do
not have a job. Abstracting from unemployment compensation, it is clear that the income share
of this group is zero, and we can thus note that the respective Lorenz curve segment is given by
Q0U (λ) = 0 and relevant for all λ ∈ [0, U).
To calculate the second segment of the Lorenz curve, we follow the steps in Appendix A.5
and combine the labour income share of workers employed in purely domestic firms with a
productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕc, ϕo) – as determined by Eq. (A.17) – with the share of all
production workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms up to productivity ϕ̄:


























To determine the third segment of the Lorenz curve, we compute the share of total domestic
labour income accruing to workers who are either unemployed or employed in firms with a
productivity level up to ϕ̄ ∈ [ϕo,∞) – as represented by (A.21) – with the share of production
workers who are either unemployed or employed by these firms:











This allows us to calculate the third segment of the Lorenz curve



























which is relevant if λ > bU . Putting the three segments together, gives the (extended) Lorenz





0 if λ ∈ [0, U)
Q1U (λ) if λ ∈ [U, bU )
Q2L(λ) if λ ∈ [bU , 1]
. (S.30)
The Gini coefficient for the distribution of labour income can then be calculated according to
AU (χ) ≡ 1 − 2
∫ 1
0 QU (λ)dλ, and it is given by (32). QED
The concept of Lorenz dominance
We now consider a second criterion for ranking distributions and look at the criterion of Lorenz
dominance. Thereby, we say that distribution A Lorenz dominates distribution B if the Lorenz
curve of A lies above the Lorenz curve of B for any cumulative share of population p. Since
the Lorenz dominance is equivalent to mean-preserving second-order stochastic dominance, all
measures of inequality that respect this criterion – such as the Gini coefficient or the Theil index
– rank A as a more equal distribution than B if A Lorenz dominates B.
Self-employed agents
The Lorenz curve for the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky is given by
QaS(µ) = 1 − (1 − µ)
k−ξ̄
k . (S.31)
Hence, the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky Lorenz dominates the
respective income distribution under partial offshoring if QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) holds for any µ ∈ (0, 1).
We have to check this inequality separately for the three segments of QS(µ). Let us first look
at domain µ ∈
(
0, χ/(1 + χ)
)
. In this case, QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ), is equivalent to D
0
S(µ, b) ≡
bµ− 1 + (1 − µ)b < 0, with b ≡ (k − ξ̄)/k. Twice differentiating D0S(µ, b) with respect to b gives
∂D0S(µ, b)
∂b
= µ+ ln(1 − µ)(1 − µ)b,
∂2D0S(µ, b)
∂b2
= [ln(1 − µ)]2 (1 − µ)b. (S.32)
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with ∂D0S(µ, 0)/∂b = µ + ln(1 − µ) < 0, ∂D
0
S(µ, 1)/∂b = µ + ln(1 − µ)(1 − µ) > 0, and
∂2D1S(µ, b)/∂b
2 > 0. Accounting for D0S(µ, 0) = D
0
S(µ, 1) = 0, we can therefore conclude that
D0S(µ, b) < 0 and thus QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) must hold in the relevant parameter range.




, it follows from (S.23) and (S.31) that QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) is
equivalent to D1S(µ, b) ≡ (b−1)χ+[1−(1+χ)
b−1](1+χ)(1−µ)b < 0. Therefore, ∂D1S(µ, b)/∂µ <
0 implies that D1S
(
χ/(1 + χ), b
)
≡ D̂1S(b) = (b − 1)χ + (1 + χ)
1−b − 1 < 0 is sufficient for
Q1S(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) to hold in the relevant parameter domain. Twice differentiating D̂
1
S(b) yields
dD̂1S(b)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ)(1 + χ)
1−b, d2D̂1S(b)/db = [ln(1 + χ)]
2 (1 + χ)1−b. Accounting for
dD̂1S(0)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ)(1 + χ) < 0, dD̂
1
S(1)/db = χ − ln(1 + χ) > 0, and d
2D̂1S(b)/db
2 > 0,
it follows from D̂1S(0) = D̂
1
S(1) = 0 that D̂
1
S(b) < 0 and thus QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) must hold for all
µ ∈
[
χ/(1 + χ), 1/(1 + χ)
)
.
Finally, we look at domain µ ∈
[
1/(1 + χ), 1
]
. In this case, QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) is equivalent
to D2S(µ, b) ≡ −(1 + χ)
b(1 − µ)b + b(1 + χ)(1 − µ) < 0, according to (S.24) and (S.31). Twice
differentiating D2S(µ, b) with respect to µ gives ∂D
2
S(µ, b)/∂µ = b(1 + χ)
b(1 − µ)b−1[1 − (1 +
χ)1−b(1 − µ)1−b], ∂2D2S(µ, b)/∂µ





/∂µ = b(1 + χ)(χb−1 − 1) > 0, it is thus immediate that D2S(1, b) = 0 is sufficient for
QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) to hold in the relevant parameter domain.
Putting together, we can thus conclude that QS(µ) < Q
a
S(µ) holds for any µ ∈ (0, 1), which
proves that the income distribution of self-employed agents under autarky Lorenz dominates
the respective income distribution in an offshoring equilibrium for arbitrary values of χ ∈ (0, 1).
QED
Production workers












k−(1−θ)ξ̄ if λ ∈ [Ua, 1]
, (S.33)
where Ua = θξ̄/[k − (1 − θ)ξ̄], according to (27). The ranking of QaU (λ) and QU (λ) depends
on the unemployment rate of production workers in the offshoring scenario relative to autarky.
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Furthermore, as outlined in the main text, the ranking of U >,=, < Ua is equivalent to the
ranking of 1 >,=, < ∆(χ; η) and thus equivalent to the ranking of α(χ; η) >,=, < β(χ; η). From
Appendix A.4 we know that there exists a unique χ̂ ∈ (0, 1), such that α(χ; η) >,=, < β(χ; η) if
χ >,=, < χ̂.
Let us first consider χ ≥ χ̂, which corresponds to an offshoring equilibrium with U ≥ Ua.
In this case, we have QaU(λ) = QU(λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, U
a) and QaU (λ) > QU (λ) = 0 for all
λ ∈ [Ua, U). Furthermore, combining (S.27) and (S.33), it follows that, for domain λ ∈ [U, bU ),
the ranking of QU (λ) >,=, < Q
a
U (λ) is equivalent to the ranking of






1 − β(χ; η)λ̂
]b̂
>,=, < 0, (S.34)

















Consider first the case of β(χ; η) ≤ 1. Since χ ≥ χ̂ implies β(χ; η) ≤ α(χ; η) and thus ∆(χ; η) ≤
1, it is immediate that β(χ; η) ≤ 1 is sufficient for dD1U (λ̂)/dλ̂ < 0. Noting further that λ = U
implies λ̂ = 0 and thus D1U (0) = α(χ; η)[∆(χ; η)
b̂ − 1] < 0, we can therefore safely conclude that
QU (λ) < Q
a
U (λ) holds for all λ ∈ [U, bU ) in this case.
But what happens if β (χ; η) > 1? In this case, we cannot rule out that dD1U (λ̂)/dλ̂ < 0.


















1 − β(χ; η)λ̂
)1−b̂
1 − β(χ; η)





From inspection of (S.35) and (S.36) we can therefore conclude that dD1U (λ̂)/dλ̂ ≥ 0 is sufficient
for d2D1U (λ̂)/dλ̂
2 > 0 if β(χ; η) > 1. To see this, note that β(χ; η)λ̂ < β(χ; η)λ̂U , with λ̂U ≡
(bU − U)/(1 − λ) must hold on the relevant parameter domain. Substituting for bU , we obtain
β(χ; η)λ̂ < 1 − χ1−(1−θ)ξ̄/k < 1. From inspection of (S.35) and (S.36) it therefore follows that if
dD1U (λ̂)/dλ̂ ≥ 0 holds for some λ̂0 ∈ (0, λ̂U ), then dD
1
U (λ̂)/dλ̂ > 0 must hold for all λ̂ ∈ (λ̂0, λ̂U ).
Furthermore, recollecting from above that D1U (0) < 0, this implies that if D
1
U (λ̂) ≥ 0 holds for
S11
some λ̂ ∈ (0, λ̂U ), then D
1
U (λ̂U ) > 0 must hold as well. Accordingly, we can infer insights on the
sign of D1U (λ̂) by evaluating (S.34) at λ̂ = λ̂U . This gives


































However, since β(χ; η) > 1 implies α(χ; η) > 1 if χ ≥ χ̂, it is immediate that α(χ; η) <
η(1 + χξ̄/k), and this implies D1U (λ̂U ) < 0. Putting together, we can therefore safely conclude
that QU (λ) < Q
a
U (λ) holds for all λ ∈ [U, bU ) irrespective of the ranking of β (χ; η) >,=, < 1.
In a final step, we have to look at domain λ ∈ [bU , 1]. According to (S.29) and (S.33), for
this parameter domain the ranking of QU(λ) >,=, < Q
a
























∆(χ; η)b̂ >,=, < 0. (S.38)
Notably, the sign of D2U (λ̂) does not depend on the specific level of λ̂, so that sgn[D
2
U (λ̂)] =
sgn[D2U (λ̂U )]. However, since D
1
U (λ̂U ) = D
2
U (λ̂U ) holds by definition, it follows that QU (λ) <
QaU (λ) extends to interval λ ∈ [bU , 1]. Summing up, we can thus conclude that the income
distribution of production workers under autarky Lorenz dominates the income distribution of
production workers in the offshoring equilibrium if the share of offshoring firms is sufficiently
high, i.e. if χ ≥ χ̂.
Let us now consider χ < χ̂, which implies ∆(χ; η) > 1 and thus U < Ua. In this case, we
have QU (λ) = Q
a
U (λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ [0, U ] and QU (λ) > Q
a
U (λ) = 0 for all λ ∈ (U,U
a). For
domain λ ∈ (U, bU ), the ranking of QU (λ) >,=, < Q
a
U(λ) depends on the sign of D
1
U (λ̂), where
D1U (0) = α(χ; η)[∆(χ; η)
b̂ − 1] > 0 holds if χ < χ̂. But what can we say about the sign of D1U (λ̂)
if λ̂ > U? To answer this question, it is worth looking at (S.36). From the formal discussion in
Appendix A.4, we know that ∆(χ; η) > 1 requires Ω̂(κ̂) ≡ (κ̂ζ−θ − 1)(ζ − 1)θ − κ̂+ 1 > 0, where
ζ ≡ 1 +χξ̄/k and κ̂ ≡ ηζ. In view of Ω̂′(κ̂) = (1 − 1/ζ)θ − 1 < 0 and Ω̂(1) = (ζ−θ − 1)(ζ − 1) < 0,
we can conclude that ηζ < 1 is necessary for ∆(χ; η) > 1. This implies that β(χ; η) < 1 must
hold for all χ < χ̂. Hence, if D1U (λ̂) has an extremum at λ̂ ∈ (0, λ̂U ), this extremum must be
a maximum. In view of D1U (0) > 0, we can therefore conclude that D
1
U (λ̂) is positive for all
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λ ∈ [U, bU ) if D
1
U (λ̂U ) ≥ 0, while D
1
U (λ̂U ) < 0 implies that there exists a unique λ0 ∈ [U, bU )
such that D1U (λ̂) >,=, < 0 if λ0 >,=, < λ. Noting finally that sgn[D
1
U (λ̂U )] = sgn[D
2
U (λ̂)]
holds for all λ ∈ [bU , 1) and accounting for limχ→0D
2
U (λ̂U ) = (1 − η
1−b̂)(1 − λ̂)b̂∆(χ; η)b̂ > 0,
limχ→χ̂D
2
U (λ̂U ;β) < 0 (see our extensive discussion for domain χ ≥ χ̂), the following conclusion
is immediate: For sufficiently small χ, the distribution of labour income with offshoring Lorenz
dominates the respective distribution without offshoring. For χ smaller than but close to χ̂,
Lorenz curves QaU and QU intersect and it is therefore not possible to rank the distributions
of labour income with and without offshoring according to the criterion of Lorenz dominance.
This completes our discussion on Lorenz curve dominance. QED
Economy-wide income distribution
For computing a comprehensive measure of economy-wide income inequality, we have to solve
the problem that distributions of profit and labour income overlap if θ > 0. Due to this overlap,
we cannot simply calculate Gini coefficients for ranking the economy-wide income distributions
with and without offshoring, but instead look at the Theil index as an alternative measure of
income inequality. In discrete notation the Theil index for the income distribution in a group of














where yi is income of agent i, while ȳ is the average income. One of the main advantages of the
Theil index as compared to other measures of inequality is its decomposability. For instance, if

















In our model, we can distinguish two main income groups and hence can write the Theil index
for the economy-wide income distribution as follows













where TS , TL are the Theil indices for income distributions of self-employed agents and em-
ployed production workers, respectively, while aS , aL represent these groups income shares, as
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ργ(χ; η) + (1 − ρ)(1 − ξ̄/k)







ργ(χ; η) + (1 − ρ)(1 − ξ̄/k)





ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
TS +
ργ(χ; η)
ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
TL + ln
(
ργ(χ; η) + (1 − ρ)(1 − ξ̄/k)












ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
ln
(
(k − ξ̄)∆(χ; η)
k − (1 − θ)ξ̄
)
. (S.43)
In autarky, we can explicitly compute the Theil indices for the income distribution of self-
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To determine the impact of offshoring on Theil index T we first consider the benchmark case
of θ = 0. In this case, (S.43) reduces to
T =
1 − ρ









ργ(χ; η) + (1 − ρ)(1 − ξ/k)
ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
)
. (S.47)
Since we know from our extensive discussion on Lorenz curves that the income distribution
within the group of self-employed agents in autarky Lorenz dominates the respective income
distribution under offshoring and since the Theil index, although not relying on the Lorenz
36In the interest of analytical tractability, we have chosen a slightly different decomposition of the Theil index
than in the main text. However, it is straightforward to show that (33) and (S.41) are equivalent, when setting
TU = TL − ln(1 − U), aL = aU and accounting for (34).
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curve, respects (mean-preserving) second-order stochastic dominance – which is equivalent to
Lorenz dominance – we can safely conclude that TS > T
a
S holds for all χ > 0. Using (S.44) in






ρ(1 − ρ)(1 − γ(χ; η))
ργ(χ; η) + 1 − ρ
+ ln
(
ργ(χ; η) + (1 − ρ)(1 − ξ/k)













ρ2(1 − ρ)γ(χ; η)(ξ/k)2




Noting further that ∆̂T (0) = 0, it follows that ∆̂T (χ) > 0 holds for all χ > 0. For θ = 0, we can
therefore conclude that an increase of χ from zero to any positive level increases Theil index T ,
and hence renders the economy-wide distribution of income less equal.
Let us now consider the more sophisticated scenario with θ > 0 (and thus ξ̄ instead of ξ).
While in the model variant with labour market imperfection, we are not able to rank T and
T a for arbitrary levels of χ, we can at least compare Theil indices for the two limiting cases
χ = 0 and χ = 1. Since TL = T
a
L, while TS > T
a
S hold if χ = 1, we can safely conclude that
T − Ta > ∆T (θ; â), with
∆T (θ; â) ≡
ρ(1 − ρ)(1 − η)





ρη + (1 − ρ)(1 − â)








ρη + 1 − ρ
[
η ln 2 −












ρ2(1 − ρ)(1 − η)â [ρη + (1 − ρ)(1 − â) + η(1 − â)]
[ρη + 1 − ρ] [ρη + (1 − ρ)(1 − â)] [1 − (1 − ρ)â] (1 − â)2
> 0. (S.51)
In view of ∆1T (0) = 0, this implies that ∆
1
T (â) > 0 holds for all â ∈ (0, 1). While the sign of
∆2T (θ; â) is not clear in general, it is immediate that ∆T (θ; â) > 0 holds for sufficiently small
levels of θ. Hence, we can conclude that a movement from autarky to high levels of offshoring
will unambiguously increase economy-wide income inequality if the motive for rent-sharing is
not too strong. This completes our discussion on the Theil index. QED
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Source code for the calibration exercises in Sections 5 and 6
The calibration exercise has been executed in Mathematica.37 We offer here the source code
as well as the parameter estimates used in our calibration. At first, we set parameter values:
k = 4.306, σ = 6.698 and θ = 0.102, based on the results in Egger, Egger, and Kreickemeier










where χG = 0.149 is the share of offshoring firms in Germany as computed from Moser, Urban,
and Weder di Mauro (2009). We then define ξ and check that k > ξ holds.38
ξ=(σ-1)/(1+θ(σ-1));7
If[k<=ξ, Print[“Error:k<=ξ”]];8
We also define α(χ; η) from (13) and β(χ; η) from (28) as well as γ(χ; η) = α(χ; η)/(1 + χ) and
∆(χ, η) = β(χ; η)/α(χ; η).
α=1+χ (̂(k-ξ)/k)(η(1+χ (̂ξ/k))-1);9
β=1+χ (̂(k-(1-θ)ξ)/k)(η(1+χ (̂ξ/k)) (̂1-θ)-1);10
γ=α/(1+χ);11
Δ=β/α;12
Now we can turn to aggregate income in the source country relative to autarky, see Eq. (22):
37A self-contained Computable-Data-File (CDF), which can be run on the free to use CDF-player offered by
Wolfram Research, Inc. under http://www.wolfram.com/cdf-player/, can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
38In the source code, we use ξ instead of ξ̄ to save on notation.
S16
Φ=((1/σ)+((σ-1)/σ)γ)(1+χ) (̂(k+σ-1)/(k(σ-1)))((k*σ-ξ)/(γ*k(σ-1)+k-ξ)) (̂(k-1)/k);13




where ua refers to the autarky unemployment rate. Finally, inter-group inequality between
entrepreneurs and workers as well as intra-group inequality within both groups, each normalised




In a last step we evaluate the above defined functions at χ = 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and






Print[“χ= ”, z, “ I= ”, 100*(nΦ-1), “ u= ”, 100*(nu-ua), “ ω= ”, 100*(nω-1),25
“ AM= ”, 100 (nAM-1), “ AL= ”, 100 (nAL-1)];26
,{z0, {0.01,0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9, 1, χ
G
}}]27




To determine the Gini coefficient for income of all production workers in (32) we first need to
specify the Gini coefficient for income of employed production workers in (30). Considering AL
from above, we obtain
AL1=(θ*ξ)/(2(k-ξ)+θ*ξ)*(AL);29




For the definition of Theil indices we first need to specify the income share of entrepreneurs,




respectively. Furthermore, we also determine the income share of self-employed agents, as defined
in (34):
aS=(1-ρ)/(ρ*γ+1-ρ);35
Average income of the three subgroups – entrepreneurs, freelance offshoring agents, and employed




while for the self-employed we obtain
vS=((ρ*γ+(1-ρ)*(1-ξ/k))/(ρ*γ+1-ρ))*k/(k-ξ);39
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We now determine the product of income ratios and log income ratios for entrepreneurial income
multiplied by the relative frequency the respective income ratios are realized. For purely domestic
firms, this gives
Alt1=((k-ξ)/(k+χ*ξ))*k*x (̂ξ-k-1)*Log[((k-ξ)/(k+χ*ξ))*x ξ̂];40
while for offshoring firms, we obtain
Alt2=((k-ξ)/(k+χ*ξ))*k*((1+χ (̂ξ/k))*x ξ̂-1)x (̂-k-1)*Log[((k-ξ)/(k+χ*ξ))((1+41
χ (̂ξ/k))*x ξ̂-1)];42
We can compute similar expressions for production workers and obtain
Alt3=(((k-ξ)*Δ)/(θ*ξ*β))y (̂((1-θ)*ξ-k)/(θ*ξ))*Log[y*((k-ξ)*Δ)/(k-(1-θ)*ξ)];43
for workers employed in purely domestic firms and
Alt4=(((k-ξ)*Δ)/(θ*ξ*β))*η*((1+χ (̂ξ/k)) (̂k/ξ))y (̂((1-θ)*ξ-k)/(θ*ξ))*Log[y*((k-44
ξ)*Δ)/(k -(1-θ)*ξ)];45
for workers employed in exporting firms.
In a last step we evaluate the new inequality measures at χ = 0.01, 0.1, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.9 and
χ = χG to produce the results in Table 2.
Do[z=z0;46




In a second step, we evaluate the Gin coefficient for income of all production workers at χ = 0




We now turn to the Theil index for entrepreneurial income, which in autarky can be computed
according to
Alt00=Alt1/.{χ-> 0};51
TMa= NIntegrate[Alt00, {x, 1, Infinity}];52
The respective Theil index in the case of offshoring can be determined according to
Alt11=Alt1/.{χ->z};53
Alt22=Alt2/.{χ->z};54
TM=NIntegrate[Alt11, {x, 1, z (̂-1/k)}]+NIntegrate[Alt22, {x, z (̂-1/k),55
Infinity}];56
In a similar vein, we can calculate the Theil index for income of employed production workers
under autarky and in the scenario with offshoring. This gives
Alt55=Alt3/.{χ->0};57




TL=NIntegrate[Alt33, {y, 1, z (̂-θ*ξ/k)}]+NIntegrate[Alt44, {y,61
z (̂-θ*ξ/k)(1+z (̂ξ/k)) θ̂, Infinity}];62
respectively. Thereby, it is notable that in the scenario with offshoring, firms which shift produc-
tion abroad pay a wage premium to their domestic workers, and this wage premium is captured
by an upward shift of the lower bound of the second integral in the equation for TL.
The economy-wide Theil index under autarky is then given by
Ta1=aM*(TMa)+aL*TLa+aM*Log[vM]+aF*Log[vF]+aL*Log[vL];63
Ta=Ta1/.{χ->0};64




To avoid rounding errors, we can manipulate the result in the following way
If[TL<TLa + 0.1 (̂10)&&TL>TLa - 0.1 (̂10), TL=TLa];67










To complete the calibration exercise, we finally add
Print[“χ=”, z, “ ΔAS=”, 100*(AS-ASa)/ASa, “ ΔAU=”, 100*(AU-AUa)/AUa, “ ΔTS=”,75
100*(TS - TSa)/TSa, “ ΔTU=”, 100*(TU-TUa)/TUa, “ ΔT=”, 100*(T-Ta)/Ta];76
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